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Abstract
The municipal bond market is widely perceived to be
amenable to influence peddling between parties to bond
transactions.

One of the primary concerns of both

regulators and investors is the relationship between
political contributions by bond market participants and
the volume and profitability of bond market business
engaged in by those participants. This study uses
publicly available data from the state of Louisiana to
provide evidence concerning the relationship between
contributions made by bond market participants and bond
business awarded or influenced by recipients of those
contributions.
Contributions by bond market players to officials
likely to possess influence over bond transactions are
determined to be larger than those made by other
contributors, and candidates for three of the offices
examined are identified as receiving significant
contributions from bond market players.

A relationship

is similarly found between contribution levels and method
of bond issue placement.
The study also investigates financial information
disclosure by bond issuing entities and the effects of
that disclosure upon bond prices.

Timely disclosure, as

vi
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measured by compliance with state reporting regulation,
is found to have no discernable effect upon bond interest
costs.

The information content of financial reports is

modelled by Brown's Index, and is shown to be a
significant component of the interest cost model.
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Chapter One

Introduction
The municipal bond market is currently the subject
of SEC scrutiny, multiple courtroom debates, several
congressional investigations and numerous articles in the
financial and general press.

This research project

speaks to one aspect of that market: the reputed
relation between political contributions and municipal
bond transactions.

Specifically, the research question

addressed is:
Is there a direct and positive relationship between
political contributions made by players in the bond
market1 and (1) selection of these players for
various bond deals and (2) bond prices [Net Interest
Cost]?

Further, is there a relationship between

availability of financial information and bond
prices?

l'Players in the bond market1 is a term of art intended to
refer to those firms and individuals whose occupation is
providing services to issuers of municipal securities.
This includes underwriters, bond counsel, those issuing
legal opinions, and other consultants or advisers to the
process.
1
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The importance of this question is demonstrated by
the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board's [henceforth
MSRB] recently issued Rule G-37 [MSRB 1994].

Rule G-37

prohibits any player in the bond market from doing
business with state or local governments or their funding
entities for two years after that firm's dealers, bond
professionals or political action committee(s) contribute
to an officeholder in those governments.

This rule was

prompted by the widespread perception that influence over
municipal bond transactions is routinely used by elected
officials to extract contributions from market players,
and has exposed the MSRB to a hail of criticism
concerning its de facto interference in the political
process.
Regulation intended to influence the behaviour of
political actors cannot help but reflect legislator and
regulator perceptions of the political process.
Providing those legislators and regulators with empirical
data verifying the existence or lack thereof of this
widely assumed influence peddling in the bond market will
enable them to develop more accurate perceptions of the
political process, which should result in more
appropriate regulation of that process.

Importantly,

regulation to date has focused on those methods of
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influence purchase amenable to discovery - that is, cash
contributions to political campaigns.

As discussed

later, there are myriad other avenues available to those
wishing to provide "off the record" support for
candidates [thus possibly purchasing influence].
This study makes no attempt to investigate those
avenues of support, as the data would necessarily be
anecdotal and thus not amenable to statistical analysis.
Corollary to this limitation of data is a restriction on
interpretation of results: a finding of no relation
between contributions by players and municipal bond
business volume or actual bond interest rates may not be
seen as conclusive evidence that influence peddling does
not take place.

A failure to find a significant relation

between contributions and bond business should rather be
interpreted as an indication that if said influence
peddling is taking place, it is transacted through
channels other than explicit campaign contributions.
This would mean, of course, that current MSRB disclosure
regulations focusing on reported contributions will
probably not have much effect on the widely theorized
influence peddling.
Both the MSRB and the SEC have vigourously defended
Rule G-37, and both maintain their intention to continue
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targeting undue influence in the municipal marketplace.
This despite stories in the press of "workarounds"
sculpted by players in the municipal bond market

that

conform to the letter of G-37 while allowing players to
continue supplying funds to candidates.

These

"workarounds" may be as simple as providing resources for
campaign fundraising events or as complex as providing
for third party contributions (e.g., employing an
independent political consultant who contributes
heavily). To date the MSRB has mandated disclosure of
contributions by market players and their consultants,
and has imposed restrictions on market players' freedom
to participate in transactions with state or local
governments whose elected officials accepted campaign
contributions from them or their consultants. Market
players, meanwhile, protest that the government has yet
to provide any authentication of their claims about
influence-peddling.

This study seeks to provide some

evidence of the existence, or lack thereof, of that
influence-peddling, again subject to the caveat that only
reported contributions are analyzed.
Ramifications of this issue for accountants are
varied.

First, CPAs often function as advisors to bond

transactions or evaluators of the adequacy of refunding
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arrangements.

Thus CPAs are as susceptible as other

market players to rent extraction by officials peddling
influence over the bond transaction, and are likely to be
affected by regulations concerning contribution activity.
Second, this issue is part of a wider drive for more
complete and continued disclosure by municipal bond
issuers.

Obviously, those responsible for issuance of

financial reports by debt-issuing entities will find
themselves affected by this increased workload.

CPAs

functioning as auditors for issuers will also be affected
by the need for continued disclosure.
Third and finally, the SEC specifically mentions the
need for improved:
[D]isclosure of potential conflicts of interest and
material financial and business relationships among
issuers, advisers and underwriters, including those
arising.from political contributions... [SEC 1994,
emphasis mine].
It seems likely that the SEC will attempt to impose at
least some responsibility for disclosure upon auditors of
governmental entity financial statements, as it has upon
auditors of nongovernmental organizations.

Thus, the

results of this research project can provide guidance for
the accounting profession as well as input into the
policy setting process.

Importantly, regulation may be

driven more by a need to influence public perceptions
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than a desire to effectively restrict behaviour.

This

study speaks to the likelihood of regulation altering the
behaviour patterns of elected officials and bond market
players rather than the effects of said regulation on
attitudes about the bond market.
Perhaps because of the difficulty in obtaining
details of political contributions, and in discovering
the linkages between individual contributors and player
firms, there is not a well-established methodology for
research of this nature.

Further, the availability of

data concerning bond issues placed prior to recent rules
on reporting such information [e.g., the 1993 disclosure
mandate issued by the Louisiana legislature] is limited
as well.

In an attempt to overcome the limitations of

data availability, this study will be limited to the
state of Louisiana, and the 1991 - 1994 election cycle.
Limiting the study to data from one state severely limits
the extensibility of the study to other states, however
that extensibility is somewhat suspect in any event
because campaign finance statutes and bond issuance
regulations vary widely by state.
The 1991 election cycle was selected for several
reasons.

First, MSRB regulation G-37 took effect in

1995, thus making the 1991 cycle the last "free for all"
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cycle.

Postulating that market players were aware of

increasing federal agency concern with influence
peddling, and that players were motivated to take full
advantage of a soon to be unlawful strategy, there is a
distinct possibility that contributory activities
increased in this period.

One of the measures of proper

targeting of contribution regulation [subject, as
discussed earlier, to the assumption that the purpose of
regulation is to inhibit undesirable behaviour rather
than to influence public perceptions] is the extent to
which that soon-to-be regulated behaviour occurs prior to
the effective date of the regulation.
Secondly, campaign reporting regulations underwent
several modifications after the 1991 cycle, including the
removal of a requirement that campaign finance filings be
cumulative in nature.

This change in filing format

increases the difficulty of data collection, and
simultaneously increases the probability that
contributions which should be included in the data set
will be excluded.
Finally, reporting requirements had been in place
for previous elections, thus candidates and their
respective campaign organizations should have been
familiar with those requirements.

Staff at the Ethics
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Commission for Elected Officials had also had the
opportunity, in the course of auditing past filings, to
assist candidates in understanding what information
needed to be filed and what format that information
should take.
Contribution data has been collected for all
relevant statewide offices by inspection of campaign
finance filings with the State Board of Ethics for
Elected Officials [henceforth SBE].

Firm affiliations of

individual contributors are established by comparison of
contributor data with membership lists of the relevant
professional organizations and by review of 'The Red
Book', which is a publication listing players in the
municipal market by firm and location.

Contributor data

for bond counsel was also verified by review of the
Martindale-Hubbell directory of attorneys by
specialization.

In the spirit of conservative data

modeling, this process, if not completely accurate, will
understate the relation between player political activity
and business volume or bond rates.
Data was collected for bond issues by entities
within Louisiana for the period 1991 through 1995, as
tabulated by the Louisiana Bond Commission [LBC].
Louisiana statutes require that all governmental entities
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seeking to issue debt present their offering for the
approval of the LBC.

Utilizing a fairly complete

population of bond issues will provide greater
generalizability of results as well as greater likelihood
of finding an effect.
An initial analysis is performed using various
statistical tests that a), provide some indication of the
relation between the population of contributor/players
and the population of contributors in general, b),
compare the distribution of the volume of player bondrelated business with the distribution of player
contributions, and c), examine the relation between
player contributions and the decision to competitively
bid the issue.

These tests should provide evidence of

the existence and strength of the relation between
contributions and player business.
Candidates for office frequently encounter
significant startup expenses when initiating campaigns.
Timing of contributions is therefore an important aspect
of campaign finance.

This study focusses on the relation

between contribution amounts and bond business rather
than contribution timing.

Contribution amounts are

summed over the entire election period rather than
specifically identified by date.

Analysis of "early
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money” contributions is thus not possible within the
scope of this project.
Following this general analysis, further examination
of the data is performed using regression techniques to
investigate the effects of contributions on net debt
cost.

That is, the tests will provide evidence

concerning the public costs of public officials peddling
influence for contributions.

For this purpose, public

cost is defined as an increase in NIC attributable to
campaign contributions by bond issue participants.

This

analysis should yield information useful in deciding how
much to spend in alleviating the hypothesized problem.
Importantly, this portion of the project utilizes a
base regression model well established in the literature,
which helps to ensure that any finding of public cost
[that is, NIC greater than the base regression model
would predict] is not an artefact of an unrelated
characteristic of the issue.

This project should

therefore be seen as an incremental approach to the
general problem of the municipal bond market rather than
as a novel approach to a specific aspect of that market.
Hildreth [1993] suggests that the solicitation
and/or making of political contributions by players in
the municipal bond market can generate two fundamental
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types of problems:

(1) contributions are made in an

attempt to obtain or retain business, and (2)
contributions are made to "allow" entry into the pool of
underwriters (i.e., "pay to play").

Note that these

problems relate to a relationship between underwriters
and politicians having influence over placement of bond
issues.

Both of these possibilities are exacerbated by

the frequent use of negotiated rather than competitively
bid sales transactions. Competitively bid sales can
reduce the risk of either type of problem to some degree,
however it should be noted that even under a perfectly
competitive regime the possibility of soliciting
contributions in exchange for non-underwriting consulting
work or eventual resale of bonds at favorable rates
continues to exist.
It is also important to consider the contributory
behaviour of market players from a broad perspective.
That is, contributors are probably not making donations
in hopes of influencing a single transaction, or for that
matter a single type of transaction.

As Rasmusen &

Ramseyer [1994] note in a discussion of bribes that
relates equally well to campaign contributions:
Through the contributions, the lobbyist obtains not a
vote but the privilege of conveying information to the
legislator, [p. 315]
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For instance, a bond attorney may very well make
contributions to campaigns with the simultaneous goals of
a) gaining business by "locking in" his position as bond
counsel,

b) gaining business by being seen to be a

confidant of the candidate's, and c) gaining business in
non-bond related areas by increasing awareness of his
firm.
Similarly, an investment banker may be interested in
garnering a local government's short-term investment
business as well as underwriting its bond issues.
This perspective allows us to dismiss worries about
targeting specific contributions to specific ends: we can
safely assume that influence, once purchased, will be
used wherever profitable (and possible).
Given the relative uniqueness of the topic under
investigation, a discussion of theoretic underpinnings
to these assumptions about influence peddling is
appropriate.

Section I provides a description of the

transactions under investigation which section II builds
upon by using extant theories (principal-agent and
competitive markets) to motivate the situation and
players.

Section III summarizes the data required to

investigate these motivations.

While this study is

largely descriptive and does not attempt to develop
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hypotheses differentiating eventualities under the
various theories, it is important to attempt at least a
general theoretic explanation for why the behaviour this
study investigates might occur.
A.

The Bond Issue Transaction
The sequence of transactions involved in municipal

bond issuance is convoluted and dependent upon several
endogenous factors.

That being the case, it is

worthwhile to enumerate a generic sequence of events to
facilitate later discussion of the motivations and
actions of the various players.
The first step in the process is, obviously, a
governmental unit deciding to issue debt securities.
This is an iterative process of comparing costs and
timing of revenue and payment streams over several
alternatives.

This task is usually completed with the

assistance of several players,
counsel,

(1) the unit's bond

(2) a financial advisor,

(3) representative (s)

of the likely underwriter(s) , and (4) the unit's legal
counsel.

Decisions are made as to the net proceeds

reasonably realizable, the amount of debt to be issued
(face value, which is not equal to the amount of proceeds
in most cases), stated interest rate (which is usually
not the same as the rate at which the issue is sold to

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

14

underwriters or that earned by eventual holders), timing
of interest payments, and callability features.
For purposes of this study, governmental unit may be
defined as an agency of the state government of Louisiana
or one of its political subdivisions [parishes,
municipalities or special funding districts].

This

includes agencies such as the Louisiana Public Facilities
Authority (LPFA), Louisiana Public Housing Authority
(LPHA), etc.

The preponderance of these agencies are

staffed by administrators who are appointed rather than
elected.

While appointment of administrators might seem

to negate the utility of an investigation of campaign
contributions, it merely places influence peddling on a
less direct level.

Officials of these agencies are

appointed by elected officials (largely the Governor),
and thus are susceptible to the direction of those
elected individuals.

It is reasonable to expect that

these appointed administrators will seek to please the
person(s) responsible for their position.

Thus any undue

influence will be passed through from elected official to
decision maker.

Given the by nature larger dollar volume

of state-wide agencies compared with parish or municipal
entities, attempts at influence peddling should be more
discernible

at the state-wide office level.
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The second step in the process is selection of an
underwriter (or more often in recent years, a team of
underwriters) .

The governmental unit often makes

negotiated sales of its bonds to underwriters - that is,
it does not go through the competitive bidding process2.
Some states, Louisiana for instance, have an agency
specifically charged with reviewing issues for all
entities within the state prior to placement:

these

agencies typically recommend competitive placement.
Note, however, that recommendations are precisely that recommendations and not mandates.

As staff at these

agencies freely admit, there are numerous legal loopholes
allowing entities to circumvent

agency recommendations,

and several rationales for preferring negotiated
placement.3
As a more complete picture of the bond issuance
process emerges, including the ways in which players take
advantage of their private information and positions of
Nationally, approximately 80 percent of new bond issues
are placed by negotiation rather than competitive bid.
3A staff person at the Louisiana Bond Commission related
the story of the Avondale bond issue. It seems that even
though the structures to be constructed are several hundred
yards in length, weigh thousands of tons, and are designed
to be stationary and permanently anchored, bringing to mind
buildings rather than vessels, the bond issue was exempt
from LBC governance because these structures are not land
structures. As the staff person put it, "All they need is
clever counsel."
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relative power, states are increasingly writing
legislation requiring competitively bid sales.

The

primary point of competitively bid sales is reducing the
ability of underwriters to buy bond business via
political contributions, a secondary effect being to
ensure the highest price possible for the bonds.
Unfortunately, this tactic is having only limited effect
as politicians, and

the administrators they appoint, can

effectively constrain membership in the pool of
underwriters allowed to place bids by setting up
certification processes of various sorts.
Finally, the underwriters offer the bonds to
investors, making a profit on the spread between their
cost and the market rate at time of sale.

It is apparent

that timing of the issue can be a crucial issue for
underwriters, who carry the risk of unfavourable market
rate fluctuations.

Another important factor is the

credit rating assigned to the issue or to the entity
itself.

Issuing entities are interested in being rated

as highly as possible, since a higher rating translates
into a larger potential market for the issue.

Issuing

entities may also be interested in facilitating the
timing of the issue's sale, so as to demonstrate to
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prospective bidders on future debt issues that the
entity is a cooperative member of the relationship4.
These transactions are assumed by oversight agencies
to be market-driven and market-policed, an assumption
that, according to the media, these agencies should be
disabused of.

Given the peripatetic nature of bond

issuance, it is prudent to recognize that the trusting
reliance on market structure evinced by oversight
agencies is indeed misplaced.

Moreover, the after-market

for municipal bonds is far from complete; trading is
infrequent and no system presently exists to publicize
bid-ask quotes when trades do occur.
The bond issuance process, as a result of the
situations articulated above, is susceptible to abuses of
the public trust and unfairly advantaged trading by some
players.

As a necessary precursor to any conclusions

about causes or solutions to such abuses, the next
section attempts to explain the actions of various
players from the perspectives of two theories of economic
behaviour.

4This aspect of the issuer - underwriter relationship is
pointed out in Lynch [1996].
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B.

Theoretic Background
Tax-exempt bonds have historically been investment

vehicles bought and sold in relative obscurity.

The

business press discussed these bonds mostly in relation
to changes in the tax code, and the lack of transaction
volume made the provision of pricing information
problematic.

Federal regulatory agencies have treated

bonds as a locally regulated issue, opting to stay out of
the process, leaving disclosure an open question usually
answered by underwriters.

In this information scarce

environment opportunism can and arguably does flourish.
Recently, significant attention has been devoted to
municipal bonds, probably as a result of the default of
several very large issues.5 Concomitantly, the clamor
for modification of the bond market has become louder.
This section of the chapter seeks to articulate some of
the underlying motivations for observed behaviour on the
part of bond market players, a necessary prerequisite to
legislating constraints that will alter that behaviour.
This issue can be approached most directly from a
competitive markets perspective.

Keim & Zardkoohi [1988]

provide a cogent analysis of the solicitation of and

5see Schifrin [1989], Hawthorne [1987], Business Week
[1993] for a sample of reporting about municipal bonds.
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influence by PAC contributions that applies equally well
to influence with respect to the bond transactions
studied here.

Keim & Zardkoohi's perspective of the

market for campaign contributions is empirically
supported by Snyder [1990].

Snyder uses data from open-

seat races for the U.S. House of Representatives during
the period 1980 - 1986 to validate a simple model based
on the idea of campaign contributions as investments.
Results of the analysis support Keim & Zardkoohi's work.
Following their lead, we view the bond issuance
transaction as taking place in a market for services
(influence).
Adapting their perspective, underwriters are seen to
be buyers of future business, while candidates for office
are sellers of "good will" that ostensibly assures the
buyers of future business.

Note that the buyers are not

certain of actually receiving the influence they pay for,
as the election is, at least in some sense, a gamble.
Therefore buyers are motivated toward two activities that
moderate the "cost" of acquiring influence.

Even given

that potential profits from bond business are quite
large, buyers are still motivated to minimize the expense
of capturing that business.

Buyers may well consider

campaign contributions as relatively minor expenses, but
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expense minimization remains a primary tool for
increasing profits.
For illustrative purposes, assume that the influence
underwriters are trying to buy is only useable during the
immediately subsequent term of office.

This assumption

merely clarifies the situation, relaxing it does not
change the point or the motivations behind actions.

In

fact, relaxing this assumption, that is looking for
influence-peddling over a longer period of time, would
make finding evidence of the hypothesized relation more
likely.
First, underwriters seek to drive the price of said
influence down in response to the risk that their
candidate will not be successful.

This price reducing

behaviour is moderated by the knowledge that at some
point reduced contributions could be a causal factor in
the candidate's failure to win the election.

Candidates

are motivated by their need for reputation to fulfill
their obligation to exert influence on their
contributors' behalf.
The second response of buyers to the cost of
influence, in this case targeted toward reduction of risk
rather than reduction of outlay, is to purchase influence
from all candidates.

This practice should be reflected
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in campaign contributions to every candidate.

Again, it

is obvious that this strategy has negative ramifications,
assuming that there is some increase in probability of
election associated with an increase in funds available.
The negative ramifications are the tendency of
contributory behaviour to spiral the cost of successful
campaigns (hence the cost of influence) upward.

In this

case the buyers, in an attempt to reduce risk, increase
costs for themselves.
Bondholders are affected by similar motivations.
Rather than purchasing business, they are seeking to
purchase an investment that pays better than alternatives
available in the market.

Importantly, that increased

payoff may consist entirely of risk reduced below the
level assessed by the general marketplace.

In the

obvious case, the bondholder is provided information not
publicly available regarding the 'true' financial
situation of the entity, or is provided assurances of
payment not incorporated into the formal bond purchase
agreement. For this strategy to work, underwriters do not
need to be party to private information concerning actual
risk levels or the arrangement between officeholder and
bondholder.

Because of the lack of information

concerning the identities of ultimate bondholders, this
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facet of the hypothesized relation will not be
investigated.
A similarly useful perspective to adopt is that of
principal-agent theory.

Under this theory, all players

are modeled as self-interested and able to make rational
decisions based upon complete information in furtherance
of that self-interest.6 While the issue of information
availability to decision makers is key to hypotheses
developed under this theory, the present analysis does
not address the issues of continued information
disclosure by issuing entities.

The study focuses rather

on the behaviour of parties to the debt issuance
transaction.
The very nature of representative forms of
government mandates that a subset of government
transactions will occur outside the boundaries of
publicly observable behaviour.

The important issue here

becomes moral hazard (the ability of agents to make
choices that are not discernable to the principal, that
is, choices not affecting reputation).

In this case the

6Simon [1982] and others have addressed the more
realistic situation where information is incomplete
and/or decision makers have limited abilities to process
information. As our focus is on putatively unobservable
behaviour rather than decision making mechanisms, this
study does not address those issues.
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decisions themselves, as well as the outcomes of those
decisions, may not be apparent to the general public.
Agency theory, with its focus on moral hazard, thus has
several applications to the topic of this study.
On the highest level, the candidate seeks to achieve
a position with access to public resources.

Her self-

interested goal is to maximize her benefit from these
resources.

This self-interested goal remains relevant

even if contributions from bond market players are not,
in toto, significant relative to total contributions.

As

Rasmusen & Ramseyer [1994] indicate:
Legislators in modern democracies (a) accept bribes that
are small compared to the value of the statutes they pass
... [p. 305]
It is apparent that the awarding of bond issues is a
situation where the office-holder is handling a public
resource, and that the office-holding agent is motivated
toward siphoning off the largest fraction of that
resource possible without incurring penalties.

One

method of siphoning off resources is to trade influence
over the underwriter selection process (an action usually
unobservable to the public) for campaign contributions.
Equally, the underwriter is motivated to secure as
much underwriting business as possible at the least cost
possible.

As might be expected, competitive bidding is
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not the most efficacious method for him: the underwriter
would prefer negotiated placement, which effectively
removes competition from the process of determining
interest costs.

The underwriter is motivated to make

campaign contributions to garner uncontested business by
the fact that the contribution is less costly than the
reduction in profits caused by competitively bid
business.

It is also possible, as discussed previously,

for officials to create a "pay to play" environment.

In

this environment competition for bond business is limited
to a select pool of bond market players. The included
players have a significant advantage over those not
included in the pool of available transaction partners.
Using either theoretic perspective highlights the
issue at hand; do underwriters and candidates behave in
the manner predicted?

As is evident from the cited

articles in the business media and the interest in
regulation indicated by the convening of several federal
investigative committees, the common perception is that
players in the bond market do participate in influence
peddling.
C.

Data Sources
This study requires data about several disparate

roles and the individuals filling those roles.

Data
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concerning the sources and amounts of campaign
contributions to candidates for public office, the number
of issues and dollar volume of bonds placed with the
various underwriting firms is required as are the
identities and contributory activities of other players
in the bond marketplace.

In the interests of clarity,

the discussion of data elements and sources is segregated
by player role.
1.

Elected Officials
As elucidated above, politicians are perennially in

search of campaign funds.

The information relevant to

this study is directly related to the success or failure
of that search: that is, data regarding contributions
received.

Federal and state election regulations mandate

the filing of campaign finance statements which provide
detailed listings of contributions. These documents
should be readily procurable for all states, however this
study will be restricted to Louisiana.
Given the vast number of elective offices contested
in elections scattered across the calendar and around the
state, the study focusses on elections for state office
only.

This focus should facilitate data availability and

precision since local election data is often delayed,
discarded more quickly, and of questionable accuracy.
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While it could be argued that a large fraction of taxfree government bond issues are locally designed and
placed, the surge in creation of state oversight
commissions in recent years ameliorates the influence of
local officials. Further, market players seek to maximize
their business transaction volume (both dollar volume and
number of transactions), and thus are motivated to focus
their efforts on officials having influence over multiple
transactions.

To further focus the data set, elective

offices most likely to possess influence over the bond
placement decision are investigated.
listed in table 1.1.

Those positions are

The Representatives and Senators

chosen, as well as the Treasurer, Governor, and Attorney
General are all members of the LBC.

The Lieutenant

Governor and Secretary of State are included as well,
under the hypothesis that their offices possess
significant political power.
The selection criteria tend to accentuate any
relation found between contributions and placement,
payments to candidates not as likely to exercise
influence over the bond issuance process are excluded.
This strategy ameliorates the problem of non-targeted
influence (the situation where other influence seekers
attempt to purchase generic suasion over elected
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Table 1.1

Elected Offices of Interest

Statewide Offices:
Governor
Lieutenant Governor
Attorney General
Secretary of State
State Treasurer
Senators sitting on the Louisiana Bond Commission:
Johnson
Jumonville
Nunez
Rayburn
Representatives sitting on the Louisiana Bond Commission:
Ackal
Adley
Alar
Dimos
Laborde
Riley
Theriot
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officials).

That exclusion also functions to contract

the pool of large contributors and thus highlight those
attempting to influence placement decisions.

It should

be noted, however, that this restriction obscures a
potentially large influence effect.

It is probable that

some officials with influence over bond placement
function as indirect influence hubs.

That is, their

influence may be purchased by contributions to the
campaigns of supporters, relatives, or even opponents.7
Given the tenuous, continuously changing and largely sub
rosa nature of such relations they are left out of this
analysis.

Subsequent research attempting to highlight

relationships in this area will need to be extremely
sensitive to contextual issues, a task that is clearly
beyond the scope of this project.
Data required with respect to political offices for
this study include contribution amounts, source, source
affiliation, and recipient.

All of this information is

available in gross form in the required filings.

7I refer, of course, to the widely circulated story that
Edwards' 1991 gubernatorial campaign found some method of
providing funds for Duke's campaign in hopes (realized,
as it turns out) that Duke would draw enough support away
from Roemer to force a runoff between Edwards and a
candidate he could beat, Duke.
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In order to restrict contribution data to those most
likely to be quid pro quo in nature a floor amount for
individual contributions is established.

Contributions

under that floor amount will not be incorporated into the
analysis.

The rationale for doing so is that influence

is probably not sold cheaply.

Following the strictures

of competitive markets and agency theory discussed above,
candidates are strongly motivated to maximize the price
of any influence they seek to peddle.

Further, even

determined attempts to evade the intent of disclosure
regulation would be unlikely to resort to having myriad
individuals donate small amounts, as the logistics of
such a ploy would rapidly become unmanageable.

For this

study the floor amount is set at $250, the maximum
allowable contribution under the MSRB's Rule G-37.

That

amount should be large enough to limit the volume of
contributions to manageable proportions and small enough
to capture most if not all influence purchases.
2.

Underwriters
Hildreth [1993] speaks solely to the issue of

underwriter contributions to campaigns, as does all
pending regulation.

As Hildreth suggests, underwriters

are motivated to develop exchange relationships with
elected officials capable of influencing bond placement
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decisions.

Determination of the existence and nature of

the relation between contributions and that influence
rests on two issues.
First, the volume of underwriting business (both in
dollars and number of issues) of each underwriter needs
to be tabulated.

This information is available from the

recorded proceedings of the agency responsible for
placement of the issue.

In Louisiana, the information is

also available at the Louisiana Bond Commission.
Additionally, supplementary documentation relating to
bond placement issues is procurable and may be used to
fill gaps in data from government records.
The one limitation of data availability is related
to multi-underwriter issues.

The exact apportionment of

dollar volume to specific underwriters may not be
available, as negotiations between the lead underwriter
and other members of the underwriting pool are not part
of the public record.

This is a minor issue, however, as

it is the lead position that carries the most influence
over distribution and the identities of all underwriters
are always readily available.
Second, a critical link is the association between
underwriting business and contributions.
can be masked in a variety of ways.

Contributions

The most common
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methods of masking contributions are to have them made by
"related parties" who are not under constraints limiting
contributions.

For purposes of this study, related

parties includes company PACs, employees and the families
of employees.8 Information about employees of
underwriting firms will be acquired by determining the
underwriting firm office handling the issue and reviewing
business directories for the cities in which the offices
are located, as said directories routinely list employees
by office location.

While the task of connecting

contributor and beneficiary is an arduous one, the
candidate, prior to using her influence, would want to
independently verify the promised contributions as well.
This indicates that the driving force behind
contributions is fairly easily determinable.

In support

of that theory, consider the statements Harlan [1993]
attributes to spokesmen for Kathleen Brown and Mary

®Family members are defined as individuals listing the
same address and/or the same surname. While there are
obvious problems with using address or surname as a
linkage device, I believe the effects on this study are
minor. This belief rests upon the facts that this study
deals with state elections (which limits the
possibilities of surname repetition by reducing the
population of interest and limiting the area of possible
residence) and large contributions (which places limits
on inclusion by virtue of the relatively greater wealth
required to support large contributions). Both of these
factors should minimize distortion of results.
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Landrieu, state treasurers of California and Louisiana
respectively:
(Brown)
"[A]bout 8% of the contributions to her
1990 statewide campaign came from bond firms."
(Landrieu)
"[S]he tries to limit bond-related
contributions to about 20% of her total campaign funds."
If other office-seekers are as aware as Landrieu and
Brown seem to be of the ultimate sources of their
campaign funding, it seems likely that outside data
collection and analysis can produce similar results.
Assuming that these sorts of transactions do not
encourage trust simply makes that eventuality more
likely.
Third, information about the nature of the placement
will be collected.

Specifically, whether the issue was

placed by competitive bid or negotiation.

Negotiated

placement makes quid pro quo arrangements easy to
fulfill, therefore collecting this information should
allow more conclusive analysis of the relation between
elected official and underwriter.

Further, net interest

cost (NIC) data will also be collected for each issue.
The purpose in collecting NIC data will be to determine
whether the bonds were issued at a market equivalent rate
or not.

Bonds issued at higher than market equivalent

rates provide evidence consistent with influence
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peddling.

Market equivalence will be proxied for by a

combination of the following: size of issue, Moody's
rating of the issuing entity, date of issue (as evidenced
by bond purchase agreement signature date), risk limiting
devices (insurance, guarantee, etc.), term of the
investment (measured by years to first call) .
Since all issues under study were issued by
Louisiana entities, no adjustment for exogenous regional
economic factors is included.

Bond investors are much

more likely to be concerned with long-term economic
factors, and those factors arguably will influence all
issues from the area similarly.

That is, investors are

more likely to see Louisiana as an economic whole than to
dissect it into smaller entities when looking at overall
economic conditions that would influence investment
choices.

This is not to say that investors equate New

Orleans Airport Commission debt with that of the Bossier
Parish Water Districts, but rather to suggest that when
investors consider longer term economic trends (e.g.,
continued viability of American oil production or long
term market demand for chemical feedstocks produced by
Louisiana chemical manufacturers) they do not
differentiate across the various political subdivisions.
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D.

Summary
This chapter has identified the research question

addressed by the study: is there a relationship between
bond player contribution activity and the public cost of
municipal debt [NIC] ?

An explanation of the bond

issuance process is provided, and the various parties to
the transaction are identified.
The chapter also provides a theoretic analysis of
the hypothesized behaviour, based upon both competitive
markets theory and principal-agent theory.

Following the

discussion of theoretic backing, an assessment of data
required to investigate the question of interest is
presented.

Three distinct datasets are identified:

(1)

contributions made to campaigns of candidates for the
offices identified above; (2) details of issuance
transactions for bond issues included in the study; and
(3) financial information for each of the entities
issuing bonds included in the study.

Sources for each of

the datasets are identified, as is the method of
associating individual contributions with bond market
player firms.
There is a rich tradition of research focusing upon
the nature of the municipal bond marketplace.

That
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tradition, as enumerated in chapter 2, serves as the
baseline for this research.
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Chapter Two

Review of Literature
Relevant research studies investigating the primary
municipal market can be partitioned into two categories:
(1) those comparing results of negotiated versus
competitive placement of the issue and (2) those focusing
on the association between accounting information,
financial report presentation and net interest costs.
The competitive placement process begins with the
issuer (usually with the assistance of financial and
legal consultants) establishing maturities, interest
rates, and minimum yields for the issue, preparing a
preliminary official statement of offering, setting a
sale date and obtaining a rating.

The issue is then

offered for sale to underwriters, who make sealed bids
for the issue.

Per the axioms of market theory, this

process should ensure that the issuer is able to maximize
the price at which the issue is sold to underwriters.
Underwriters, of course, seek to maximize their returns
by selling at a maximal price to investors.

Therefore,

underwriters are willing to pay more for bond issues that
investors find attractive, and competition among the

36
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underwriters should prevent them from extracting undue
rents from either issuers or investors.
Negotiated issues, on the other hand, lack that
competition between underwriters.

In this method of

placement, the issuer solicits proposals from various
underwriters prior to setting characteristics of the
issue.1 The underwriter and issuer agree that the
underwriter will purchase the issue at a set price.
Obviously, this method of placement allows issuer
officials much greater latitude to shift business to or
from players.

The issuer is no longer afforded the

advantage of market driven monitoring of the transaction.
That is, the transaction price is set via negotiation
rather than the market, allowing collusion between
players and issuers and offering opportunities for
extraction of excess rents by the underwriter.
Other participants to the bond issuance transaction
may also be susceptible to contribution extraction by
elected officials.

Bond counsel, financial consultants,

and various advisors to the process all profit from
inclusion in the issuance transaction.

Placement method

is not directly related to the inclusion of these
*Note that the solicitation process is usually not formal
and may not take place at all, especially in situations
where undue influence is being exercised.
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individuals, as they tend to be selected prior to the
decision about what kind of placement would be
appropriate.

The selection process for these players is

typically specified by state or local acquisition
regulation [e.g., the entity may require bid solicitation
for legal services and advisory services].

Fees for

services are also often capped by regulation, which
limits the ability of advisors to trade political
contributions in exchange for excess fees.2
Studies of placement method, focussing on
underwriter selection and thus on a primary means of
influence peddling, are especially relevant to this
research.

Researchers and regulators hypothesize that

political influence peddling is facilitated by negotiated
placement - that is, that directing business toward
certain market players is easier in a non-competitive
environment [Hildreth 1994, Roberts 1994, Levitt 1993,
Harlan 1993, Hildreth 1993, SEC 1994].

This theory leads

to the idea that incorporating a variable for placement
method in the research model would mask any significance
associated with political contribution variables.

2This is the case in Louisiana for bond counsel. Fees
charged are constrained by state regulation specifying
maximum fees by issue size.
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As recent studies have indicated (Simonsen &
Robbins, 1994), variation in interest costs over
placement method choice has steadily narrowed over the
last twenty years.

This reduction in cost difference

suggests that either players are foregoing the
possibility of maximal rent-extraction as a means of de
emphasizing the non-market nature of their transactions
or that competition is occurring in the negotiated
placement underwriter selection process.

Hence, players

appear sensitive enough to reputation effects that they
maintain lower cost structures even under monopsony
conditions.

It seems possible, therefore, that the

political contribution variable may overwhelm the
placement variable.
Another factor of interest is the strong trend
toward negotiated placement.

As Simonsen and Robbins

[1994] note, in 1970 83% of municipal bonds were sold via
competitive placement: by 1993 only 20% were sold
competitively.

This switch towards negotiated placement

has been portrayed as an after-effect of increasingly
prevalent influence peddling.3 The studies discussed in
this section seek to shed light on the phenomena of

3[Patterson 1993], [Cross 1993], [Levitt 1993], [Business
Week 1993], [Hedges et al. 1993] are representative.
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placement and the various theories that have evolved to
explain observed data.
A.

Studies of Placement Method
One of the original items of interest to researchers

was the notion that some issuers of tax-exempt securities
have paid interest rates significantly above the market
rate.

The earliest research focussed on the effects of

restrictive bidding practices.

The most obvious practice

is negotiated placement of a new issue rather than a
competitively bid sale of the issue.

This practice is

often held out to be a necessary precursor to influence
peddling, as the competitive bid process provides limited
opportunity for shifting business to or away from
specific market players.

As Hildreth [1993] notes,

however, influence may be in the form of "pay to play4"
rather than outright award of business.

At any rate,

studies investigating the effects of competitive versus
negotiated placement have a history dating back to the
1960s.
The initial study of monopsony in the municipal bond
market, West [1966], used a regression model to

4That is, players wishing to be "qualified" as capable,
able to handle business the size of a particular issue,
and having "suitable depth of personnel" may be induced
to contribute.
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approximate net interest cost for selected issues between
1956 and 1963.

West's model incorporated five

independent variables:
interest rate,
issue,

(1) a measure of the market

(2) issue size,

(3) Moody's rating of the

(4) average maturity and (5) number of bids

submitted for the issues.

West found that all variables

were significant predictors of net interest cost, and
that issues with at least three bids submitted had lower
interest cost.

West interpreted his results as

demonstrating that underwriters collude on issues
receiving only one or two bids: that is, underwriters of
sparsely bid issues exercised their comparative market
power to extract larger than normal spreads from issuers.
Importantly, said underwriters may not need to engage in
explicit collusion to exercise their relative market
power.

Underwriters would not necessarily have to

communicate with their competitors in order for collusion
to occur.

It would be sufficient for underwriters to be

able to identify those issues which will not attract
multiple bids, and for each underwriter (or subset of
underwriters) to identify some segment of the limited-bid
market to bid on.
Kessel [1971] approached the issue of interest costs
via a closer look at the effects of differing numbers of
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bidders for an issue.

His results demonstrate that the

incremental benefits accruing to issuers receiving larger
numbers of bids grow progressively smaller as the number
of bids increases.

Kessel's hypothesis is simple: since

any new bidder's bid yield may be lower than the others,
an issuer's expected interest costs decline as the number
of bidders increases.

Kessel also notes that as the

number of bids increases underwriter spread decreases.
In agency theoretic terms, this indicates that the
competitive bidding process is an effective monitor if
sufficient players participate.
Ederington [1978] seeks to adjudicate between West's
and Kessel's theories.

While he explicitly states that

the theories are far from mutually exclusive, he advances
still another theory - competition among underwriters
drives interest costs down (that is, underwriters become
price-takers as the number of bids increases).
Ederington*s study dealt with public utility debt rather
than municipal, tax-free debt, but his results - support
for his competition hypothesis, weak support for Kessel's
search theory and not much support for West's economic
monopsony theory - should be readily transferable to the
municipal market.
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Sorensen [1979] examines both competitive and
negotiated placement issues, providing a comparison of
interest costs across the two methods of placement.
Sorensen's theory - that bond issues suffering from high
demand uncertainty might pay lower interest costs when
negotiated rather than competitive placement was used is borne out by his analyses.

The competitive sample was

split into two groups by rating5, and the resultant
interest costs were compared with negotiated issue
interest costs.

Sorensen found that issues receiving

only one competitive bid actually paid higher interest
costs than comparable negotiated issues.

Issues

receiving multiple bids were sold at significantly lower
interest rates than comparable negotiated issues.
Sorensen therefore concluded that the issuer's decision
about placement method should be driven by an analysis of
market forces governing underwriter participation in the
bidding process, as issues garnering less than three bids
were likely to incur interest cost premiums if
competitively bid.
sThe theory behind this is that issues with lower ratings
suffer from higher demand uncertainty than higher rated
issues. Sorensen asserted that this theory was
buttressed by the readily observable fact that lower
rated issues routinely sell at higher interest costs.
His interpretation is that a part of the higher interest
cost is a result of demand uncertainty.
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Note that Sorensen's results suggest that there may
be rational, market driven reasons (such as maximization
of return) for selecting negotiated placement.6 This
interpretation problematizes the current trend toward
statutory requirement for competitive placement (as
epitomized by New Jersey governor Jim Florio's recent
mandate7).

Sorensen's study thus brings into question

the simplistic solution of requiring competitive
placement as a way to prevent suasory behaviour.
Therefore it is important to establish the nature and
magnitude of interest cost variations under present
conditions prior to attempting to rectify the perceived
problem.
Joehnk & Kidwell [1980] partition issue cost into
two

component costs:

reoffering yield.

(1) underwriter spread and (2)

As they note,

Net interest cost (NIC) is the key measure of
borrowing cost to the municipality since it indicates the
effective rate that will be borne by the issuer. When
measured in terms of yield (percent), these costs
elements are additive for an individual bond to the
extent that
NIC = Spread + Reoffering Yield [p. 223].

s[GF0A 1994] provides a succinct discussion of the
benefits and disadvantages of negotiated sales.
7A s cited by Dickson [1993], Florio's executive order
stated in part that, "state-level issuers must select
underwriters on the basis solely of price, as determined
by sealed bids submitted after public notification."
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In their analysis Joehnk & Kidwell respond to the
explanation for NIC variation most often offered by
players - that underwriters of negotiated placement
issues provide additional services not rendered by
underwriters of competitive placement issues.

Joehnk &

Kidwell provide a set of carefully matched issues*, and
look at the variation between competitive and negotiated
NIC, underwriter spread and yield.

Their findings are

that negotiated issues' underwriter spreads average $1.48
to $2.36 higher per $1,000 bond: an amount reasonably
close to MFOA survey estimates of $2.02 to $2.21 per
$1, 000 bond consultant fee experienced by competitive bid
issuers.

This increase in spread therefore seems to be

of an amount to compensate underwriters for their
increased efforts on negotiated issues.

The higher yield

(.23 to .27 %) thus appears to be unrelated to the
additional work performed by negotiated issue
underwriters.

Note, however, that the higher yield could

be related to the higher risk perceived to be associated

8Joehnk & Kidwell used the following criteria to match
issues: (1) type of issue (general obligation or
revenue), (2) Moody's agency rating, (3) sale dates were
within two weeks of one another, (4) final maturity was
at least ten years and issues could vary by no more than
five years, and (5) par values of the issues varied by no
more than 24 percent.
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with negotiated issues rather than an artefact of
influence peddling.
Braswell et al. [1983] also address the issue of
origination cost variation across negotiated and
competitive placement issues.

True Interest Cost9(TIC)

is used as the dependent variable rather than NIC under
the assumption that TIC is a more "correct" measure of
issuer costs and thus will provide a more accurate
picture of the variation between competitive and
negotiated placements.

Braswell et al. find a variation

of approximately 18 basis points between negotiated and
competitive TICs, and note that for the average size,
maturity and TIC rates of their sample this translates
into about $265,000 in cost difference.

The size of the

cost difference suggests that underwriters are extracting
more than compensation for their additional labours.

As

Braswell et al. put it,
Surely, this more than offsets the value of the
added origination services provided by negotiating
underwriters that is not provided under competitive
bidding, [p. 105].
Bland [1985] takes a different perspective,
suggesting that variation in NIC rates is a function of
9True interest cost, a.k.a. internal rate of return or
Canadian method, acknowledges the time value of money and
has been advocated as superior to NIC as a metric for bid
evaluation.
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issuer experience in the bond market as well as
characteristics of the bonds.

According to Bland,

neophyte issuers lack the ability to competently
negotiate with underwriters and thus settle for higher
NICs than more experienced issuers would.
borne out by Bland's study.

This view is

There is an experience

effect, but it seems to stabilize after four bond issue
experiences.

Bland's research, then, indicates that

there is a base level of competency which is reached on
average after participation in four bond deals.

Issuers

with that base level competence are able to negotiate
agreements that approach the NIC rates of those issues
competitively bid by more than seven underwriters (that
is, the most attractive investment rates).

This study

may be interpreted as suggesting that if influence
peddling exists, it may not cause much of a NIC
differential.

Alternatively, influence peddling may be

so pervasive over both competitive and negotiated issues
that it is impossible to produce conclusive evidence as
to its existence by comparing the two.
Another consideration is the corrective nature of
the market.

If the primary market yield differential is

due to mispricing (sale at a price not supported by issue
or issuer characteristics), there should be a
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corresponding adjustment in the secondary market.

Maese

[1985] investigates this issue by utilizing a sample set
composed of bonds for which secondary market data was
available.

The number of issues outstanding at any one

time (over 45,000) and the unregulated, over the counter
nature of transactions severely limits data availability
in the municipal market.

In this information sparse

environment Maese was able to find secondary market data
on 58 issues.

Her analysis of primary market data

confirmed earlier studies' findings that competitively
placed issues with more than 2 bids were sold at
significantly lower NIC rates.
Surprisingly, Maese's secondary market results
indicate that no systematic price adjustment occurs for
either competitively placed bonds with less than three
bids or negotiated placement bond issues.

This discovery

supports the contention of some industry analysts that
price differentials are due to characteristics of the
bonds rather than intensity of bidding competition.

In

terms of political influence peddling, the study implies
that either said peddling does not affect the price of
bonds or that the value of peddling is seen to be an
enduring characteristic of the bond issue.
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The issue of competitive versus negotiated issuance
was revisited recently by Simonsen & Robbins [1994].

As

with Braswell et al., Simonsen & Robbins approximate TIC
rather than NIC with their model.

Simonsen & Robbins get

results in line with previous research - TIC for
competitive issues is significantly lower than TIC for
negotiated issues.

The amount of variance is, as

expected, greater for issues with more intense bidding
competition.
Theoretically, this study's discussion of the bond
market environment is somewhat troubling.

Simonsen &

Robbins accept with little discussion the arguments of
defenders of negotiated sales, especially the assertions
that negotiated sales are more suited to bonds with
"unusual structures or other atypical features" [p. 28].
Their advocacy of competitive placement is largely based
upon the idea that bond transactions must be above
suspicion.

This assertion may be entirely correct, but a

more detailed look at the problem of influence peddling
seems warranted prior to drawing such a conclusion.
Leonard [1996] provides another recent review of the
negotiated versus competitive issuance question.

His

research investigates two issues: 1) do issuers maximize
expected net benefits by rationally selecting the most
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efficacious method of sale and 2) is there a difference
in yield between issues that can be solely attributed to
the method of sale.
The first issue speaks directly to the moral hazard
problem discussed in this document - are public officials
maximizing their own utility or that of their
constituency?

Leonard finds, that:

An issue could be classified as having been sold by
negotiation or competitive bidding using variables that
measure issue size, credit risk, market conditions, and
issue complexity, [p. 25]
His interpretation is that this finding is consistent
with the "traditional" view of negotiated placement
benefiting issuers most for issues with complex
structure, issues from low credit rating issuers, larger
issues, and issues brought to market during periods of
market fluctuation.

Thus negotiated placement may be

portrayed as the optimal placement method, depending on
the circumstances involved.
Leonard's second research question assesses the
social cost of placement method by seeking a difference
in yield attributable solely to placement method. His
analysis found no difference in reoffer yields due to
placement method.

Further, the analysis suggests that

competitive and negotiated issues should not be pooled
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into a common sample without properly specifying the
regression equation (Leonard suggests pooled interactive
regression techniques).

The argument is that the

influences

of several explanatory variables are not

contiguous

across the two placement methods.

Leonard succeeds in casting some doubt on the
results of

earlier studies, perhaps as much for his

trenchant observation that the preponderance of earlier
studies date prior to 1985 and thus arguably fail to
reflect changes in market structure [e.g., an order of
magnitude increase in refunding issues, a sharp increase
in "special district" debt issuance, and much more widely
available information sets] as for his refinements of
regression techniques.

Note, however, that the issue of

more than minimal debt cost to the entity, and hence to
its constituency, is not resolved.

It is entirely

feasible for competitively bid issues to go out at
greater than optimal yields if the pool of bidders has
been constrained artificially by public officials.
In summary, the literature investigating placement
method provides mixed evidence, with no definitive
support for any of the various theories proposed to
explain variation in interest rates.

Perhaps the most

convincing explanation is that offered by Bland [1985]
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which suggests that a basic level of experience with bond
issues is the key factor in achieving lower interest
rates.

Regardless, the political influence perspective

can be adapted to any of the above theories.
This research also seeks to understand the
connection between accounting information, auditing and
interest costs.

As a precursor to building a model to

investigate those relations, a brief review of the
literature dealing with municipal bonds from an
accounting perspective is warranted.
B.

Accounting Information Studies
Wallace [1981] brought the issues of external audits

and accounting information into the set of factors
associated with bond interest costs, which she measured
by NIC.

While acknowledging that NIC calculations do not

account for the time value of money, Wallace suggests
that generally NIC will be in a monotonic relationship
with yield-to-maturity, and further that NIC has a welldocumented history as a metric in municipal bond studies
which greatly enhances generalizability of results.

As

Wallace notes
Moreover, empirical support for the correspondence
of NIC and yield in the period under study is
provided by Kidwell [1977] . [p. 506] .
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The primary goal of this study was associating
accounting variables with NIC, however Wallace chose to
incorporate several variables previously determined to
have significant explanatory power as well.

Her model is

an evolution of the models used in finance to explore the
bond market, and contains both demographic and finance
variables investigated in prior research.

This approach

adds credibility to the study, as readers can be assured
that variables unique to her study are not merely
proxying for previously discovered relationships.
Wallace's findings are that accounting and auditing
variables do not significantly contribute to the
explanatory power of the model investigating interest
cost variation.

She does find a relation between those

variables and bond rating, which in turn is a significant
explanatory factor for NIC.

These results suggest that

accounting variables may be an important factor in
determining NIC differences across issues rather than
determining NIC itself.
Wilson & Howard [1984] extend Wallace's [1981]
study, using "improved research methods on a greatly
expanded database" [p. 208].

Their results are largely

similar, although they conclude that both accounting and
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auditing variables are related to bond ratings and to
NIC.
Benson et al. [1984] focus on the regulatory
environment of municipal financial reporting.

The

federal government has in the past largely been
restricted from using the SEC to dictate municipal
accounting and reporting practices by the Tower
amendment, leaving regulation to the various states.
This environment enables the current situation where
regulations differ markedly across states, adding further
complexity to an already labyrinthine market structure.
Benson et al.'s hypothesis is that stringent state
regulation forces disclosure (and accuracy) that might be
otherwise absent, and that the enhanced credibility of
financial reports produced under more stringent
regulation will be acknowledged by the market in terms of
"more accurate" interest costs.
Obviously there is a multitude of conflating
variables to be dealt with here.

Interest costs may

reflect the additional risk assessed to issuers whose
poor condition becomes apparent under heightened
disclosure, players may discount the effectiveness of
various regulatory schema, or regulations may simply
reinforce already present disclosure behaviour.

Benson
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et al. acknowledge the weaknesses inherent in their
research and attempt to ameliorate some of those
weaknesses by performing additional analyses, but are
unable to counteract the strong multicollinearity
their variables.

among

Their conclusion is that accounting

regulations do affect how accounting information is
reported and interpreted but it is not possible (at least
at present) to assess the magnitude or direction of
effect on interest cost.
Apostolou et al. [1984] set out to test the
association of a specific quanta of financial information
- reporting of a surplus/deficit - with NIC of general
obligation bonds issued by Minnesota municipalities.
Their objective is to "extend Ball and Brown's study
[1968] to the municipal market" [p. 9]; that is, to look
at the relationship between a single 'bottom line' number
and security pricing.

Apostolou et al. select annual

surplus/deficit as the municipal equivalent of net
income.
This study seeks to illuminate the similarities and
differences between the equity securities market and the
municipal debt securities market in terms of information
usefulness.

The results of this research indicate that

"changes in the surplus/deficit are not associated with
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unexpected changes in NIC" [p. 21], suggesting that
municipal accounting numbers (or at least general fund
surplus/deficits) have less relevance to investment
decisions than corporate accounting numbers.
Structurally, this may be because municipalities are not
perceived as default risks in the same manner as private
organizations, or it may be a recognition of the
possibility of strategic behaviour on the part of
municipal administrators looking for easy passage of a
tax increase.

As Apostolou et al. point out, their study

does suggest that regulation of municipal reporting in
order to increase uniformity of reporting practice may be
beneficial to security purchasers.
Benson et al. [1986] also investigate the usefulness
of accounting information to bond investors.

Their

hypothesis is that accounting information is
differentially useful across the spectrum of risk
categories.

Risk categories are proxied for by ratings

assigned to issues by Moody's.
Results of the study confirm the hypothesis to some
degree.

Accounting variables for bonds rated Al and A

are demonstrated to have larger coefficients than Aaa and
Aa in Benson et al.'s regression model, which also
incorporates finance and economic variables.

Further,
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more of the accounting variables have statistically
significant coefficients in the Al/A sample.

The

insights gained from this research suggest that the
common practice of treating municipal bond issues as
homogenous with respect to accounting information may be
concealing the significance of some of that information.
Feroz & Wilson [1992] also investigate the
differential influence of accounting information, but
look for differences across market segmentation.

Their

hypothesis is that the association between the quality
and quantity of financial disclosure and interest costs
is stronger for entities issuing debt in local or
regional markets than for those utilizing the national
market.

Note that Apostolou et al.’s [1984] theories may

have some relevance here, as local and regional markets,
by their number, inculcate more variation in disclosure
practice than the (at least theoretically) market
enforced comparability of information found in the
national market.

Therefore Feroz & Wilson's results

arguably reinforce Apostolou et al.'s recommendation for
more uniform disclosure regulation.
Feroz & Wilson's results support their differential
information hypothesis.

Their conclusions are that

reporting quality is higher for entities utilizing the
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national market, but that market players are more
sensitive to variations in quality and quantity of
financial disclosure in the regional marketplace.

This

implies that entities using regional markets for debt
issuance can significantly reduce interest costs by
improving their financial disclosure (not necessarily
'improving' the situation presented in those financial
reports).
Brown [1993] develops an innovative approach to the
problem of political entities' lack of a "bottom line."
Brown [1993] proposes a method of assessing the financial
condition of cities that arguably could provide just such
a "bottom line" evaluation tool.

Brown's assertions rest

upon the idea that good financial health is a
prerequisite for continued provision of services to
constituents, and further that financial health may be
assessed by establishing an entity's financial strength
relative to other entities of similar size [as measured
by population].

Brown [1993] uses ten ratios [calculated

from information available from the entity's general
purpose financial statements] to create his index.

Brown

[1993] uses a database maintained by the GFOA to compare
key financial ratios of entities with those of hundreds
of entities of similar size across the nation.

One of
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Brown's innovations is a method of 'grading' an entity's
ratios so as to create a "bottom line" equivalent for
financial health of not-for-profit entities.

Brown's

study is an important innovation in the accounting
information literature, and the Index he develops will be
incorporated into this study's regression analysis.
C.

Regression Model
The placement method, financial reporting practices

and accounting information studies provide a thorough
evaluation of the generic model underlying all of these
studies.

This generic model10 is composed of the

following:
Dependent variable:
NIC

Net interest cost

Independent variables:
Size

Issue size to nearest thousand dollars.
This variable is scaled in thousands
rather than millions because of the
relatively small size of some local
issues.

10See Table 2.1 for an indication of the degree of
consensus among prior studies with respect to the
components of the base model.
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Table 2.1
Genealogy of The Base Model

Study:

Interest

Size

Rating

MktRate

YrsToMat

West 1966

NIC

$M

Moody's

Bond Buyer

Yrs

Kessel 1971

NIC

$K

5 Level

S4P

White's

In(Yrs)

Ederington 1978

I n (((bids)

$M

Indicator

Moody's

2 wks prior

Sorensen 1979

NIC

In($K)

Yrs

Moody's

Salomon

Avg Yrs

3 level

Braswell et a l . 1983

TIC

$M

2 level

Moody's

Bond Buyer

Yrs

2 level

Maese 1985

NIC

In($K)

In(Yrs)

Moody's

Salomon

Bland 1985

NIC

In($M)

Moody's

Salomon

Avg Yrs

Simonsen & Robbins 1994

TIC

Vector

Vector

Oregon Ind

Vector

3 level

Wallace 1981

NIC

Moody's

Bond Buyer

Yrs

J( bids

Wilson 4 Howard 1984

NIC

Moody's

Bond Buyer

.1 (Yrs)

In (((bids)

Benson et al. 1984

NIC

Moody's

Salomon

In(avg yrs)

In (((bids)

Apostolou et al. 1984

NIC

Moody's

wkly Region

In(avg yrs)

Benson et al. 1986

NIC

$K

Moody's

Salomon

Avg Yrs

Feroz & Wilson 1992

NIC

2 level

Moody's

Bond Buyer

$K

YrsToCall

Vector

2 level

2 level

CorNIssue

3 level

In (((bids)

o>
O
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YrsToCall Time until the issue can be called (in
years).

This variable measures the 'yield

lock in period' of the issue.
Rating

Moody's rating, if available,for the
entity and/or issue.

MktRate

Comparable market interest rate for the
week of sale.

The Bond Buyer Twenty Bond

Index will be used.
CorNIssue Competitive or negotiated placement.

This

will be a categorical variable set to 1 if
competitive and 0 if negotiated or
privately placed.11
The dependent variable selected, NIC, was chosen to
facilitate comparability between this research and prior
studies.

As [Simonsen & Robbins 1994] note, true

interest cost (TIC) is a measure of interest cost that
incorporates the time value of money and thus is arguably
a more precise metric of interest cost.

However, NIC is

routinely used by players in the market, and, when
accompanied by suitable constraints on rate variation and

u This variable may be supplanted by the number of bids
received for the issue for competitively placed issues if
I can get that information.
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payment timing12, can approach TIC in usefulness as a
measure of interest cost.

Further, TIC data will be

collected (if possible) and the model may be run with
each as a check on the possible imprecision of the NIC
model.
The base model, by design, does not include several
of the variables found significant in prior studies.
Brown's Index, which is incorporated into the expanded
model, arguably encompasses several of these variables,
including most if not all of Wallace's [1981] accounting
variables, Apostolou et al.'s [1984] surplus/deficit, and
some of Wilson & Howard's [1984] accounting variables.
D.

Summary
This chapter has discussed extant literature

investigating the factors influencing the public cost of
debt financing [NIC].

The evolution of that literature

is traced from West's original study of monopsony in the
bond market to Leonard's current work suggesting that the
bond marketplace has changed in nature as well as in
volume.
The literature relating to accounting information in
the bond market is also discussed.

Results of the

“ Common constraints include limits on the timing of
interest payments and limits on the variation in interest
rates across various maturities among others.
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various studies suggest that the utility of accounting
information to participants in the bond market is not
easily measured, in part because the entities in
question, parishes, municipalities and districts, are not
profitmaking institutions and thus cannot be evaluated
via "bottom line" analyses.

As a means of dealing with

that issue, Brown's Index is proposed as a more
appropriate measure of entity financial health.
This study proceeds by utilizing the regression
model presented in this chapter to investigate the
relationship between the factors of interest and debt
cost [NIC]. Before regression can profitably be used for
this research some indication of the existence and
strength of the relation between contributions and bond
business needs to be provided.

Toward that goal, the

analyses described in chapter three will be performed.
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Chapter Three

Methodology
This chapter discusses the methodology of the study.
Section one presents the research question.

The second

section develops hypotheses based on that question.

The

third section discusses research design and possible
threats to validity, and explains testing of the
hypotheses.

Finally, section four summarizes the

material contained in the chapter.
The municipal debt market, as noted in chapter one,
is presently the subject of much scrutiny.

Regulatory

agencies are studying the market and simultaneously
attempting to alleviate perceived weaknesses in that
market via additional regulation.

Often this regulation

addresses issues that are in the limelight as a result of
widespread media attention, which suggests that it is
media focus rather than public policy that drives much of
the regulatory environment.

Further, it is entirely

possible that the issues regulators seek to address are
not amenable to regulatory solutions.
This research project is intended to provide some
empirical data concerning the issue of contributory
behaviour by players in the municipal debt market,
64
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arguably one of the most-discussed aspects of the
municipal marketplace.

Additionally, this project will

look at the completeness of the publicly available
information set concerning municipal debt issues.
Finally, an attempt is made to assess the public cost of
non-optimal debt placement decisions made by elected
officials.
A.

Research Questions
Formally stated, is there a statistically

significant relationship between political contributions
made by players in the bond market and the selection of
those players as participants in the debt issuance
process?

Further, can the traditional municipal debt

interest cost model be used to estimate the public cost
of that relationship?

Finally, can the traditional

model for determining interest cost of municipal debt,
with the addition of relevant variables, provide a
measure of the value of entity financial information to
purchasers of the securities?
B.

Statement of Hypotheses
These questions are operationalized via the

following hypotheses [stated in the null form]:
Hx
Bond market players are not major sources of
contributions for publicly elected officials exercising
control over the bond issuance process.
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H2
The distribution of the size of player
contributions to the campaigns of elected officials is
less than or equal to that of non-players.
H3
Contributions to these officials have no
correlation with the type of placement selected.
H4
The independent variables included in the base
model [market interest rate, face amount of debt, rating
of the issuer, first call characteristics, and placement
type] do not have significant explanatory power for NIC.
H5
Contributions by bond counsel involved in the
issuance process do not have significant explanatory
power for NIC.
H6
Contributions
issuance process do not
power for NIC.
H7
Contributions
issuance process do not
power for NIC.

by underwriters involved in the
have significant explanatory
by all parties involved in the
have significant explanatory

H8
Brown's Index offinancial well-being
have significant explanatory power for NIC.

does not

H9
Issuing entity compliance with state reporting
requirements does not have significant explanatory power
for NIC.
H10
The issuing entity's lastauditedfinancial
report being dated 12 months of the issue's sale date
does not have significant explanatory power for NIC.
1.

Hypothesis One
The bond market is often portrayed as an environment

amenable to moral hazard.

That moral hazard is

epitomized by the ability of elected officials to award
bond business to market players contributing to their
election campaigns.

As explained in chapter one, it

seems reasonable to expect those elected officials to
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maximize their expected gains by seeking contributions
from all possible sources.

Therefore, one method of

gauging the likelihood that officials are falling prey to
moral hazard is to determine the total amount of
contributions received from market players in relation to
that received from all sources.

The hypothesis

investigated is expressed as follows:
Hfll
Contributions by bond market players will
account for more than 10% of total contributions received
by campaign funds of candidates for offices prospectively
able to influence bond issue business.
The choice of ten percent as a cutoff point for
differentiating between significant and non-significant
campaign funds sources was based on discussions with
various interested parties.

Those involved in campaign

financing suggested that ten percent would certainly
direct their [and thus their candidate's] attention to
the contributors as an important interest group.

The

perception of bond market players as an important
interest group certainly facilitates the perspective of
bond market players as possible trading partners in the
market for favours.
Staff at the SBE likewise agreed that contributions
of ten percent or more arising from a single interest
group [that is, from bond market players] would be likely
to generate attention by candidates.

From their,
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regulative, perspective, that amount would probably
warrant direct attention from the candidate.

In line

with those intuitions, hyopthesis one incorporates the
ten percent figure.
2.

Hypothesis Two
A second measure of elected officials succumbing to

moral hazard in the bond issuance process is the size of
contributions made by bond market players.

As above, it

seems reasonable that candidates for office attempt to
maximize their gains by extracting as much as possible
from each contributor.

Given market players'

expectations of significant income from non-competitively
awarded business, it would be rational for them to
contribute heavily, as discussed in chapter one.

A

testable version of that hypothesis is expressed as
follows:
The distribution of the size of market player
contributions to officials in a position to exercise
influence is significantly different from that of non
players, and that difference is skewed toward larger
contributions.
3.

Hypothesis Three
The market-driven nature of the competitive bidding

process suggests that it would be much easier to award
bond issue business outside "least cost" parameters via
negotiated placement than via competitively bid
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placements.

Officials seeking to dispense influence are

thus motivated toward negotiated placements rather than
competitively bid placements.

This perception is reified

by the rising tide of state legislation mandating
competitive bidding, and by the wealth of research
investigating net interest cost variance across placement
method.
The use of negotiated placement is not, however, eo
ipso evidence of influence peddling.

As discussed by the

Government Finance Officers Association [GFOA 1994], the
State Bond Commission of Louisiana [LSBC 1995], and the
California Debt Advisory Commission [CDAC 1992], there
are a number of factors to be considered in the placement
method process.

This study assumes that the variance of

those factors across the bond issues included in the
sample is representative of the total population of
Louisiana bond issues.

The factor of interest here is

the correlation of placement method and player
contributions.

A testable version of the above is:

HM
Contributions made by players involved in bond
issuance transactions are significantly related to
placement method.
4.

Hypothesis Four
As discussed in chapter two, there is a rich

tradition of research using regression analysis to
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explore various aspects of the municipal debt issuance
process.

This project seeks to take advantage of that

tradition by utilizing a base regression model developed
by aggregating the variables common to much of prior
research in the area:
NIC = Size + Rating + MktRate + YrstoCall + CorNissue
Hypothesis four tests the applicability of that generic
model to Louisiana bond issues.
Hm
The independent variables included in the base model
possess significant explanatory power for Net Interest
Cost
There are several differences between the datasets
routinely used by prior research and that used in this
project.

First and foremost, previous research, largely

conducted in the 70's and 80's, focused on relatively
large issuing entities and relatively large issues.

This

focus was driven by a lack of information on smaller
issues, and the truism that the gain to be had from
information about larger issues is larger than that
arising from information about smaller issues.

The

preponderance of prior research used bond issue
information derived from commercial information sources
such as The Bond Buyer, a daily industry newspaper, and
was thus limited to information available to those
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sources [usually information about issues large enough to
be traded somewhat actively].
By contrast, this project uses information collected
from state agencies, thus providing a much more complete
mix of both large and small issues, offered by both large
and small entities.

Using a more complete mix of large

and small issues means that the sample more closely
matches the municipal debt investment marketplace, and
perhaps more closely mirrors the information sparse
environment of that marketplace.

Smaller issues also

tend to be traded less frequently, which compounds the
lack of readily available information by limiting the
amount of transaction information available.

Given the

significantly reduced information set, the generic model
should possess lower explanatory power over this sample
than evidenced in previous research studies.
Secondly, prior research tended to utilize
information from issues originating in various geographic
and political areas, largely because of the information
limitations mentioned above.

This project breaks from

tradition in that regard, restricting data as it does to
issues originating in the state of Louisiana.

While some

constraints on generalizability of results is endemic to
that restriction, focusing on a single political entity
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is necessary to an investigation of an inherently
political phenomenon.
5.

Hypotheses Five - Seven
After looking at the relationship between

contributions and bond business from a macro level
[hypotheses one - three], the intent of this project is
to localize on the public cost of that relationship.

The

public cost of any influence exercised on the bond
placement process by elected officials is likely to be
impounded within the cost of debt issuance [that is, net
interest cost].

The base model developed by prior

researchers is used as a framework to investigate the
influence of contributory behaviour on net interest cost.
This investigation is partitioned into several
segments, seeking to provide information relating to the
various players in the bond market and their respective
contributions.

Hypothesis five relates to contributions

made by bond counsel:
Has
Contributions made by bond counsel involved in
an entity's debt issuance have significant explanatory
power for Net Interest Cost.
Hypothesis six speaks to contributions from underwriters:
Ha6
Contributions made by underwriters involved in
an entity's debt issuance have significant explanatory
power for Net Interest Cost.
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Hypothesis seven aggregates contributions from bond
counsel/ underwriters, and consultants to the issuance
process:
HA7
Contributions made by market players involved
in an entity's debt issuance have significant explanatory
power for Net Interest Cost.
These hypotheses, taken as a group, will provide some
evidence concerning the effects of contributions on Net
Interest Cost, and thus the effect on cost to the ratepaying public.
6.

Hypothesis Eight
As mentioned previously, the municipal debt

marketplace is often described as information asymmetric,
in the sense that financial information about issuing
entities is often limited, out of date, or simply
unavailable.

Hypotheses eight through ten explore the

effects of that dearth of information.
Financial reporting for governmental entities is
often considered more arcane than that of profit oriented
organizations, simply because there is no clear measure
of goals met.

Governmental entities are not seeking to

maximize reported profits, but are seeking to provide
services for their constituents and other designated
individuals.

There is, therefore, no "bottom line"

equivalent for governmental entities.

Government finance
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professionals often remark upon this lack of a "bottom
line" as one of the inherent limitations in manager
[investor] interpretation of entity financial reports.
Brown [1993] provides a method of calculating an
index of financial health based upon data available from
an entity's General Purpose Financial Statements].

The

data is then evaluated by comparison of entity financial
data with that of similarly sized entities from across
the nation and expressed as Brown's Index of Financial
Health.

Table 3.1 presents the components of Brown's

Index.
While the assertion that financial health can proxy
for the admittedly difficult to measure attribute of
success at provision of services, it is much less
troublesome to utilize Brown's Index as a measure of the
attractiveness of an entity's debt offerings.

That is,

the municipal debt market, by all accounts, follows
closely the corporate debt market in paying attention to
financial health.
Brown's Index, relying as it does on comparative
indicators, may function as a proxy for a more complete
information marketplace.

Hypothesis eight utilizes

Brown's Index as follows:
Ha8
Brown's Index of financial well-being has
significant explanatory power for NIC.
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Brown's Index Components

1.

T1 Revenues / Population

2.

T1 General Fund Revenues [own sources] / T1 General
Fund Sources

3.

General Fund Sources [from other funds] / T1 General
Fund Sources

4.

Operating Expenditures / Tl Expenditures

5.

Tl Revenues / Tl Expenditures

6.

Unreserved General Fund Balance / Tl General Fund
Revenues

7.

Tl General Fund Cash & Investments / Tl General Fund
Liabilities

8.
Tl General Fund Liabilities / Tl General Fund
Revenues
9.

Direct Long-Term Debt / Population

10.

Debt Service / Tl Revenues
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7.

Hypothesis Nine
Local government financial reporting in the United

States is largely exempt from regulation by the
Securities Exchange Commission, unlike that of publicly
held corporations.

This exemption from regulation leads

to an environment where financial reporting is sporadic,
and often driven by a need to issue debt rather than by a
need to inform current investors or the public.

In the

absence of regulation by the federal government, more and
more states have begun to mandate financial reporting by
local entities.

Typically, however, those states have

been less willing to put teeth into their reporting
statutes.

That unwillingness to establish penalties for

failure to provide continuing financial reports leads to
a situation where the state mandates, for instance,
annual audited financial reporting for all local
governmental entities, but the costs of non-compliance
with those mandates are trivial.

Not surprisingly, many

entities choose to ignore the state mandates and fail to
produce regular audited financial reports.
Louisiana, as many other states, has legislation in
place mandating continuing financial disclosure by
governmental subdistricts.

One measure of information

availability, therefore, is an entity's compliance [or
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lack thereof] with state reporting requirements.
Information as to an entity's compliance is available
from the Legislative Auditor's office, and is included in
materials prepared by that office for the LBC prior to
each of the LBC's monthly meetings.

Hypothesis nine,

looking at the determinable value of entity financial
information in the bond marketplace, can thus be
expressed as:
HA9
Issuing entity compliance with state financial
reporting requirements has significant explanatory power
for NIC.
8.

Hypothesis Ten
One of the tenets of the theory of capital markets

is that participants always act immediately on currently
available information.

Therefore, a test which places

more emphasis on currency of information available in the
bond market is indicated.

Most states, Louisiana

included, phrase their reporting requirement statutes
such that entities need to produce audited reports on at
most a biannual basis to be in compliance with the
statutes.

The capital market should be much more

sensitive to timely information, and thus should demand
[by way of interest costs] more current information.
One test of the availability of more timely
information is to compare the date of the most recent
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audit report available with the sale date of the bond
issue.

Note that sale date of the issue is the date on

which the sale agreement is formally completed, and may
occur some time after the issue is conceived of.

In some

cases, the sale date may be two or three years after
design and approval of the issue.

Arguably, prospective

investors are concerned with current status of the
issuing entity rather than its financial health at some
point in the past.

Therefore, investors should be

willing to pay a premium [in the form of lower interest
rates] for issues from entities producing continuing
financial reports.

Hypothesis ten examines the existence

of that premium price and is expressed as:
HA1o
The date of the entity's most recent audited
financial report being within twelve months of the sale
date of the issue has significant explanatory power for
NIC.
C.

Research Design

The above hypotheses delineate the questions at the
center of this study.

Before they can be addressed in

detail, some consideration needs to be given to research
design and the various threats to validity caused by that
design as well as how the study deals with those threats.
The following discussion speaks to the issue of research
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design, and attempts to provide some guidance for
interpretation and application of the study's outcomes.
Research projects in the social sciences are by
definition studies of humans and their interactions, and
thus much less amenable to quantitative rigour and
replication than research projects in the physical
sciences.

Similarly, outcomes from social science

research projects need to be interpreted with more
attention to aspects of the study that may not be
universal in nature.
One particularly troublesome aspect of much research
in the social sciences, including the present study, is a
reliance on archival data pertaining to situations that
arguably may not be representative of the environment as
a whole.

This might be expressed more clearly as a lack

of replicability.

The use of archival data also limits

the ability of researchers to provide the kind of
experimental controls useful in minimizing validity
concerns and maximizing generalizability of results,
specifically randomization of samples and equivalence of
control groups.

Given that society is not now and is not

likely to become static, and that archival studies can
and do provide decision-useful information, researchers
have developed a means of communicating about these
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issues that attempts to describe their content without
exaggerating their generalizability.

In the spirit of

that communication, the following discussion of the
study's research design is provided.
This study utilizes a research design referred to
variously as "one-shot case study" [Huck et al., 1974] or
"one group posttest only" [Cook & Campbell, 1979].

The

portion of the study looking at contributions is
comparing two groups of contributors to the elected
officials identified in chapter one: one composed of
persons or firms in the bond business, and the other
composed of everyone else.

The second segment of the

study focusses on bond issues, comparing a group of bond
issues handled by those making sizeable contributions
with a group of bond issues handled by noncontributors.
In neither case is it possible to have a control
group,exogenous to the issues of interest, as a
background metric for validation of the analyses
provided.
Huck et al. [1974] suggest that this design is
perhaps more appropriately referred to as a descriptive
study than an experimental study.

I have no quarrels

with that assessment: the purpose of this study is to
answer questions about whether an influence-peddling
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effect could be demonstrated by analysis of archival
data, not to explore causality.

As they note,

[C]hanges in observations or measurement of the dependent
variable cannot be attributed exclusively to exposure to
the independent variable, [p. 228]
The point is well taken - this study does not purport to
provide conclusive evidence as to the existence, or lack
thereof, of influence-peddling.

The study does attempt

to find some evidence of that behaviour by looking at
campaign contributions, which are widely suggested to be
a primary vehicle for these transactions.

As discussed

in chapter one, the regulative approach has been to focus
on those contributions: one of the principal objections
municipal bond market players raise to recent regulation
[MSRB Rule G-37] is the lack of evidence supporting
regulators' assertions that influence-peddling is
widespread.

This study utilizes archival, publicly

available data to provide an analysis of the relation
between contributions and bond business.
Cook & Campbell [1979] take a less dismissive
approach to what they refer to as "one-group posttest
only" designs.

They assert that experimental design is

not the only, nor perhaps the most feasible, method of
ruling out alternative interpretations, and continue by
stating:
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This is especially the case when particular threats seem
implausible in light of accepted theory or common sense
or when the threats are validly measured and it is shown
in the statistical analysis that they are not operating,
[p. 96]
Given the nature of the relationship in question largely sub rosa, and only beneficial when it remains so
- and the fact that regulators can only be assured of
regulating transactions that are publicly -reported, it is
obvious that researchers attempting to address the issue
by analyses of multiple-transaction data are severely
limited in their ability to design research strategies
that would function to minimize threats to validity.

The

ensuing discussion addresses the various threats to
validity identified by Cook & Campbell [1979] and is
semented in line with their taxonomy of research issues:
statistical conclusion validity, internal validity,
construct validity and external validity.
1.

Threats to Statistical Conclusion Validity
As Cook & Campbell [1979] note, there are three

basic issues to be addressed with respect to covariation:
(1) Is the study sensitive enough to permit reasonable
statements about covariation? (2) If it is sensitive
enough, is there any reasonable evidence from which to
infer that the presumed cause and effect covary? And (3)
if there is such evidence, how strongly do the two
variables covary? [p. 39]
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The first issue obviously relates to the power of the
statistical analyses performed.

The likelihood of of

incorrectly concluding that correlation does not exist
can be

minimized by using larger sample sizes, setting a

at a reasonable level, an using the highest power
statistical tests available for the data at hand.

This

study addresses the issue of sample size by including
every transaction for which data could be obtained,
rather than attempting to randomly select a sample for
the available data.

As will be mentioned later in this

section, that decision does have some implications for
other validity concerns.

The a for this study is set at

.05, which is a level commonly used in research in this
area.

Given the truncated nature of the contributions

data [contributions under $250 are discarded from the
dataset], and the non-normal nature of the data,
nonparametric statistical tests were selected.

The

Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test and Kolomogorov-Smirnov twosample test were chosen to test the hypothesis that
contributions from the two groups [market players and all
others] came from the same population.

The Wilcoxon-

Mann-Whitney test closely approaches the power of the
parametric t-test [close to 95 percent], and in some
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cases may be more powerful.

This test examines the

central tendency of the two populations.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is sensitive to any kind
of difference in distribution - skewness, dispersion,
central tendency, etc.

This test is a more conservative

approach, therefore if the null is rejected using this
test more confidence in the result is warranted [Siegel &
Castellan, 1988].
Another concern is violation of assumptions
underlying the statistical tests chosen.

The most

troublesome assumption made by tests used in this study
is that of independence: that the observations are
unrelated.

Given that this study incorporates all

available data from the state of Louisiana and its
political subdivisions, it incorporates multiple
contributions from individuals or corporations, and it
also incorporates multiple bond issues from a single
issuing entity.

My rationale is that artificially

truncating the dataset to enable conformance to the
precepts of independence would give rise to more damaging
problems of sample size and would damage the richness of
the analysis.

Conceptually, one may argue that

contributions to candidates for different offices are
unique, and that multiple contributions to a single
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candidate may be summed to provide a fuller picture of
the relative influence of the contributor.
The measures used in this study, contribution
amounts, inclusion in the group of market players, NIC,
and bond issue characteristics are also considered.

A

common problem with social science research is
reliability of measures.

The variables of interest in

this study are all evidentially supported: contribution
amounts and bond issue data are all exogenously
determined.

Classification of contributors as bond

market players is accomplished by review of professional
affiliations, materials intended to attract clients and
past participation in bond transactions, and is therefore
the best possible method of determining the 'true state'
of the contributors included in the study.
Random irrelevancies in the environment can also be
source of validity concerns.

Attempts were made to

reduce the risk of such irrelevancies by incorporating
them, to the extent possible, into the analysis [e.g.,
the financial characteristics of issuing entitys are
represented by Brown's Index, and fluctuations in the
market are represented by the BB 20 Bond Index].
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2.

Internal Validity Concerns
Internal validity speaks to the issue of determining

whether there is a causal relationship between two
covarying variables, and what the direction of that
causality may be.

This study does not address

directionality, as for this study directionality is
irrelevant.

It is not discernable whether contributions

relate to prior business awarded or future prospects of
business awards, and extremely likely that contributors
would not make contributions without some expectation of
future gains commensurate with those contributions.
Finding evidence of a relation between past business and
present contributions would not disaffirm the
hypothesized relation between contributions and bond
business, but would suggest that bond market players
possess more power in the relation than is commonly
acknowledged.1 As the relation would be in evidence
regardless of perceived directionality, the issue is not
considered.
History and maturation address changes in the
environment generated by causes exogenous to the

xBond market players responding ex post to business
awards would imply that the market for influence is
characterized by few bidders for money and many offerors,
a characterization at odds with experience.
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analyses, and in this study could possibly instantiate in
cases of multiple issuance by a single entity.

Similar

issues are raised by reference to selection, although in
this case the threat is that there are differences
between the issuing entities.

The assertion of this

study is in accordance with Bland's [1985] finding that
issuers with more than four bond issuance experiences
possessed a plateau of expertise in the process that
enabled them to approximate competitively bid NIC via
negotiated placement.

Given that this study uses NIC as

the dependent variable, it is reasonable to assert that
entities are in very relevant ways equivalent with
respect to bond issuance techniques.

That equivalence is

considered prima facie evidence that history, maturation
and selection are adequately controlled for.
Importantly, determining the level of response a
study should direct to internal validity concerns is a
recursive and systematic process.

First, researchers

need to develop a sensitivity for ways in which those
concerns may have influenced the data.

Second, an

examination of the data will assist in determining which
of the threats need to be addressed directly.

Finally,

when all possible threats have been ruled out, one may
draw conclusions.

Those conclusions may provide input to
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further thought about one or more issues may be
influencing the data.
As Cook & Campbell explain, one avenue of addressing
these concerns is via the plausibility of alternative
explanations implicit in recognizing said concerns.

It

may well be that alternative interpretations can be ruled
out by consideration of their nature and implications.
Chapters four and five of this study address alternative
interpretations of study results.

As with all archival

research, the strength of causal inference in this study
is not as robust as that produced by randomized
experimentation.
3.

Possible Threats to Construct Validity
Influence-peddling in and of itself is not amenable

to measurement.

A precursor to investigation of the

phenomenon, therefore, is developing a measurable
construct to represent that phenomenon which does not
simultaneously measure other phenomena.

That is, the

possibility that alternative, equally probable
explanations of observed phenomena exist.
In the situation of interest to this study, several
factors operate to reduce the risk of threats to
construct validity.

One factor minimizing the risk to

construct validity is the assumption that contributors
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are, in important ways, economic rational actors - that
is, they do not gratuitously make contributions, but
rather are motivated to do so only by the prospects of
some sort of reward.

This self-interested behaviour on

the part of contributors ensures that candidates need to
dispense something in return for contributions; the
relationship is quid pro quo.
Another factor limiting alternative explanations is
the assumption that any influence purchased will be used
where and when possible.

Contributors are characterized

as buying a route to the official's attention, rather
than as purchasing specific instances of influence.

This

assumption functions to dismiss worries about the
intended nature of influence, as any influence purchased
is treated as pervasive.

Alternative explanations

focussed on specificity of intention are thus ruled out.
A final limiter of construct validity concerns is
the study's nonconsideration of causal linkages.

For

purposes of this study, it is nonrelevant that the
relation between contributions and bond business may be
indirect and confounded with other variables, for
instance friendship with the candidate.

The present

study does not attempt to establish causality, merely to
demonstrate covariance.
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Concerns over construct validity are also addressed
by the use of more than one test of the hypothesized
relation.

Contributions to candidates are considered in

toto, and the distribution of those contributions is also
investigated.

Various alternative explanations for test

results were also considered, for example, the
possibility that the population of bond market players is
wealthier than the general population of contributors.
Results of the analyses tend to disaffirm this
interpretation.

Contributions by players, in toto or

individually, do not appear to be inherently higher than
those of the balance of the population.
4.

Threats to External Validity
The key concern of researchers and consumers of

research is typically the generalizability of research
results.

Note that generalizability across populations

is different than generalizing to a well-defined target
population, and that both may be desirable traits of
research studies.

This study attempts to provide

information generalizable to player selection and bond
issuance in the state of Louisiana.

The further

extension of that information to other states is subject
to several limitations, which will be discussed in
chapter five.
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Interactions between selection and the event of
interest can produce biases in results of tests.

For

this study, interactions should theoretically be
minimized, as all data examined was extracted from the
public record - that is, no effort on the part of
reporting entities was involved other than that necessary
to comply with state and federal regulations.

The use of

public data may, however, incorporate some systemic
recruitment factors.

Primary among these is the tendency

for those violating the law to fail to report information
which might lead to public knowledge of their violations.
In terms of this study, entities populated by
opportunistic officials may choose to disobey reporting
requirements.

This factor should be minimized in the

present study by virtue of the study's focus on statewide
elections only.

Obviously, the decision of a local

entity to report or not is made by local officials, thus
not directly made by the officials under consideration in
this study.

It is certainly true that methods of suasion

may be exercised by state officials, but that practice,
as that of influence-peddling, should be consonant with
practices in the balance of the state.
There may also be interactions between setting and
treatment.

This study utilizes data from all issues
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reported/ and includes data from issuing entities of
varying sizes, financial health, and economic climate.
The economic climate of the state, and the South in
general, serve as a common background for all issues.
This section of the chapter has addressed validity
concerns for the study as a whole.

Concerns with

specific hypotheses are spoken to as the hypotheses and
results are presented.

The next section of the chapter

presents a discussion of the hypotheses individually, and
places each within the the framework of this study.
5.

Hypothesis Testing
Hypotheses one through three and five through seven

rely upon data collected from campaign finance reports
filed by candidates for election.

While these reports

are generated by the candidates themselves [or their
funding committees], they are subject to audit by the
Ethics Commission.

This possibility of audit functions

to discourage inaccurate reporting, and thus lends
legitimacy to analyses based on this data.

Data

concerning cumulative contributions of $250 or more were
collected for all candidates for the offices of interest
[see table 1.1].
Determination of bond market players was made in
accordance with the plan enumerated in chapter one.
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Underwriting, consulting and bond counsel firms and
individuals were identified by several measures: review
of the "Red Book" published by Thomson Publishing,
Moody's Municipal and Government Manual, compilation of
firms actually having an association with the issues
included in the sample, and review of business
directories. Additionally, the Martindale-Hubble
directory of attorneys was reviewed for attorneys
specializing in bond-related matters.
Once the firms were identified, their employees were
identified by perusal of city directories, yellow page
advertisements of the firms [which routinely list those
practicing under the firm's banner], and by reference to
individual names appearing on various forms filed with
the LBC.

Affiliated persons [spouses, immediate family

members] were identified by surname and/or address, both
of which are required information on campaign
contribution reporting forms.
Hypothesis one examines total contributions from
bond market players [importantly, this is total player
contributions, not just successful player contributions]
as a fraction of total campaign contributions reported.
Contributions of less than $250 are excluded from the
calculations.

The predicted result is that, for each of
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the offices selected, bond market player contributions
total more than 10% of all contributions over $250.
Hypothesis two, concerning the distribution of
player contribution sizes, tests for a difference between
that distribution and the distribution of non-player
contributions.
are considered.

Again, only contributions of $250 or more
This hypothesis is tested by calculation

of Mann-Whitney test statistics and Kolmogorov-Smirnov 2sample Test statistics.

Given the truncation of

distribution inherent to using a level of the variable of
interest to limit sample selection, it seems prudent to
utilize non-parametric tests that should be less
influenced by the normality of distribution.
Tests will be run on the aggregate of contributions
to all selected offices, and also on individual offices.
This should allow conclusions as to the pervasiveness of
the behaviour under study, as well as allowing isolation
on specific offices.

The predicted result is that the

distribution of player contributions is negatively skewed
with respect to the distribution of all other
contributions over $250.
Hypothesis three tests the relation between
contributions by successful players [those actually
participating in the issuance] and method of placement.
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As above, nonparametric test statistics are performed.
The prediction arising from the prior discussion of
candidate motivations is that there is a postive relation
between contributions and negotiated placement of bond
issues.
A multiple regression model was used to test
hyotheses four through ten.

The regression model used is

developed by reference to extant research examining
municipal debt issues.

As discussed in chapter two, Net

Interest Cost is used as a dependent variable rather than
True Interest Cost [a discounted cash flow measure] so as
to maximize comparability with prior research and sample
size [the state agencies requiring bond issue information
reporting routinely collect NIC rather than TIC].
Additional variables are added to the model in an
attempt to discern their significance with respect to Net
Interest Cost, which is the primary public cost of debt
issuance.

These additional variables are incorporated

singly and also in concert.

All variables are subjected

to analysis for covariance with other variables, as well
as analyses intended to bring out the need for
transformation of any of the variables.
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The additional variables are:
BCCont

Contributions to candidates made by
issue's bond counsel.

the

This variable is

the amount of contributions made by
successful players rather than the total
of all contributions by bond counsel.
UWCont

Contributions to candidates made by
issue's underwriters.

the

As above, this

variable is the amount of contributions by
successful players only.
SumCont

Total contributions made by all parties
involved in the bond issuance.

Brown

Brown's index calculated with scoring from
1 to 4 rather than -1 to 2. This
alteration was made so as to remove the
possibility of an Index score of 0.

AudComp

A categorical variable indicating the
issuing entity's compliance [or lack
thereof] with Louisiana reporting
statutes, as reported by the Legislative
Auditor.

LastAud

A categorical variable indicating whether
the entity's most recent financial
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statement at sale date was dated within
the last twelve months.
Predictions of coefficient signs can be made based
on the earlier discussions concerning market theory.
Each of these coefficients were tested against the null
that there is no measureable effect on Net Interest Cost
arising from either political contributions or
availability and timeliness of financial information
about the issuing entity.
BCCont

positive

UWCont

positive

SumCont

positive

AudComp

negative

LastAud

negative

Those predictions are:

Summary
This chapter presents the research questions
investigated by the study: Is there a relationship
between political contributions and bond business?

Is

there a public cost [as measured by increases in Net
Interest Cost] to those political contributions?

Is

there a relationship between issuing entity financial
information availability and the cost of that entity's
capital?
questions.

Testable hypotheses are developed from these
Data collection methods are presented and
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parameters for sample selection are discussed

The

chapter also enunciates expected results, and details the
statistical analyses performed.
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Chapter Four

Data Analyses
This chapter presents details of the analyses
performed and discusses results of the study.

The first

section explicates data collection methods and provides
descriptive information about the bond issues included in
the sample.

Section two presents analyses of the

research hypotheses relating to campaign contributions.
The third section discusses the regression model, and
presents results of analyses investigating the publicly
available information set.

Finally, section four

presents an extension of the regression analysis, with an
eye toward the changing nature of the municipal bond
marketplace.
A.

Data Collection
Information required for this study is derived from

several sources. All of the data sources rely upon
publicly mandated information disclosure, which greatly
facilitated data collection.

All filings are also

subject to review for accuracy by state agencies, which
lends some assurance of reliability to those filings.
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1.

Campaign Contributions
Contribution data was collected from filings with

the State Board of Ethics for Elected Officials.

The SBE

requires candidates for office to file election finance
reports for all elections in which contributions total
$5,000 or more, the candidate disburses more than $5,000
in campaign related expenses, or the election area
comprises more than 250,000 constituents.

Reports were

available for all of the offices determined to be of
interest to this study.
Campaign finance reports are required periodically
throughout the election period, so there were several
filings for each candidate.

During the 1990 election

cycle regulations mandated that reports be cumulative in
nature: candidates were required to report not only the
dollar amount of contributions as they were received but
also the cumulative total of contributions from each
contributor for the entire election cycle.

This

requirement has since been rescinded, making data
acquisition for subsequent election campaigns
significantly more difficult.
Transaction details were collected for all
contributions greater than $250 [the maximum amount
allowed under MSRB G-37].

Data collected included
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candidate to whom the contribution was made, cumulative
amount contributed, and the name and address of the
contributor.

As discussed in chapters one and three,

bond market players were identified by perusal of
industry manuals, business directories and LBC records.
The contribution dataset was then matched with player
information to provide player contribution data by
candidate.

Table 4.1 provides an analysis of

contributions partitioned by source.
2.

Bond Issuing Entities
Louisiana, as other states, mandates financial

disclosure by its political subdivisions.

The office of

the Legislative Auditor is charged with accepting and
reviewing financial reports from the various entities,
and is empowered to provide audit services to those
entities unable or unwilling to procure them elsewhere.
The Legislative Auditor's office also maintains a
database of these financial reports, and provides reports
to the LBC concerning compliance with state reporting
requirements and the financial condition of entities
seeking to offer debt.
Financial data necessary to compute Brown's Index
were collected from the Legislative Auditor's repository
of financial statements.

As detailed in Table 3.1,
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Table 4.1
Contribution Source Data
Mean

Median

Mode

Maximum

Total $ This
Source

Bond Counsel

1,395

500

600

10,000

224,541

Underwriters

2,105

5, 000

1,.000

5, 500

214,722

All Playersl

1, 708

1, 000

1, 000

10,000

462,943

Non-Players

1, 412

500

712

10,000

13,610,041

1

All Players includes bond counsel, underwriters, financial and other consultants.

O
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Brown's Index is calculated from financial data available
from the entity's general purpose financial statements
[GPFS].

The Legislative Auditor's office also provides

reports to the LBC concerning entity compliance with
reporting statutes, and that information was gathered
from monthly summaries prepared for the LBC.
3.

Bond Issues
The LBC is charged with monitoring public debt

arising from sub-districts of Louisiana, and must approve
new issues prior to sale as a part of that monitoring
process.

The LBC must also approve appointments of bond

counsel, financial advisors, underwriters, and other
parties to the issuance [LBC 1995] .

Therefore the LBC

maintains records for each bond issue, including details
of the transaction such as involved players, sale date,
amount of the issue and Net Interest Cost.

Data was

collected for all issues mentioned in the minutes of the
monthly meetings of the LBC.
Data concerning bond issues was also gathered from
Thomson Publishing, publishers of the industry's daily
newspaper, The Bond Buyer.

Thomson collects data on

larger issues, limiting its focus to those having a face
value of more than $1 million.

Data from both sources

were combined, and issues with incomplete data were
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discarded.

The final sample is composed of 290 issues.

Descriptive data for the sample are presented in Table
4.2.
Sample statistics do not, in general, mirror those
of the publicly reported bond market.

For instance,

negotiated issues comprise nearly 80 percent of new issue
debt according to the 1994 Bond Buyer Yearbook, but are
56 percent of issues in this sample.

65 percent of all

issues are revenue bonds, while 72 percent of this sample
are.

Mean issue size also varies, with the general

population having larger means than this sample.

There

is a distinct relation between issue size and rating,
with rated bonds accounting for 85 percent of the dollar
volume of the sample but only 60 percent of the number of
issues.

Unrated bonds make up 40 percent of the sample

by issue count, but less than 15 percent by face amount.
The sample is fairly consistently spread across
issuing entity, with 23 percent arising from
municipalities, 73 percent from parishes and under 5
percent being state agencie issuances.

This spread

indicates that the sample is not being overpowered by
state agency issues and thus reinforces the extensibility
of the study to the general population of Louisiana bond
issues.
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Table 4.2a
Descriptive Sample Statistics
Total $ Vol

Mean Issue $

K-S Z'/P

N-ct

% [N-ct/$]

Placement Method:
1,269,258,756

7,883,595

988,662,104

7,664,047

1,633,384,466

10,889,230

624,536,394

4,460,974

1,592,318,715

16,084,027

Baa or Lower

331,443,042

4,419,241

Unrated

334,159,103

2,880,682

Negotiated
Competitive

161

55.5/56.2

129

44.5/43.8

150

51.7/72.3

140

48.3/27.7

5.5438/.0000

99

34.1/70.5

1.7179/.0055

75

25.9/14.7

116

40.0/14.8

3.3384/.0000

Issue Type:
Revenue
General Obligation

2.0342/.0005

Rating:
Aaa or Aa or A

1 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z statistic comparing the distribution of face value between the indicated groups and
the associated p value.

table cont'd.
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Table 4.2b
Descriptive Sample Statistics
T1 $ Vol

Mean Issue $

K-S Z/P

N-ct

% [N-ct/$]

Issuing Entity:
Local
Parish
State Agency

511,913,392

7,528,138

1,644,737,468

1.0428/.2269

68

23.4/22.7

15,470,026

215

74.1/72.8

101,270,000

14,467,143

7

2,226,244,757

10,550,923

31, 676, 103

400,963

1,765,309, 175

8, 487, 063

492,611,685

6, 007,460

1,454,550,071

8,762,350

803,370,789

6,478,797

2.4/4.5

Issue Size:
Large [ > $1M]
Small

2.2635/.0001

211
79

72.8/98.6
27.2/1.4

State Audit Regulations:
Compliant
Non-compliant

7.5815/.0000

208

71.7/78.2

82

28.3/21.8

166

57.2/64.4

124

42.8/35.6

Last Audit:
Within 12 months of sale
Noncurrent

1.9924/.0007
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The above are to be expected given the nature of the
sample collected.

Louisiana is a largely rural state,

and does not contain the population centers that
typically generate larger debt issues.

This sample also

contains issues not typically recorded in industry
statistics because of their small size and the
peripatetic nature of bond issuance by small, less
populous districts.

Including those smaller issues from

less frequent issuers allows conclusions about the bond
market in Louisiana as a whole, rather than just the
large issue, more completely traded segment of the
market.
B.

Analyses of Contribution Data

1.

Hypothesis One

Bond market players are not major sources of
contributions for publicly elected officials exercising
control over the bond issuance process.
The magnitude of influence attributable to bond
market players is the focus of Hypothesis One.

As

explained in chapter three, market theory prompts us to
the belief that influence is if not directly at least
proportionately related to contributions.

This belief is

demonstrably shared by government regulators, who have
focused their attempts to minimize improper influence on
the campaign finance process.

Therefore, an
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investigation of said improper influence needs to begin
with an assessment of the relative strength of influence
of interested parties: in this case, bond market players.
As discussed in chapter one, individual
contributions of less than $250 are considered to be too
numerous to possess significant influence and to be too
small in amount to attract the necessary attention from
candidates and their staff.

This dismissal of

contributions smaller than $250 is echoed by the MSRB,
who chose to set the statutory cap on non-influential
contributions by bond market players at that amount.
Table 4.3 summarizes contribution data for the offices of
interest in this study.

Candidates for three of the

offices under consideration received contributions in
excess of $250 from bond market players totaling more
than 10 percent of all contributions greater than $250.
Interestingly, the candidate for Treasurer garnered
33 percent of total contributions from bond market
players.

The staff of the LBC, charged with preparing

information to assist the commission in its
deliberations, reports to the Treasurer.

The Treasurer

is also responsible for arranging debt issuance for state
agencies.

It is not surprising, then, that bond market
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players would have an interest in gaining the ear of the
successful candidate.
Representative Theriot also received contributions
in excess of 10 percent of total contributions1.

Theriot

is a CPA, and has been involved with public finance for
some time.

Since the time period of interest to this

study, Theriot has run successfully for the office of
Treasurer.
Senator Nunez was at the time President of the
Senate as well as a member of the LBC.

Contributions to

his campaign by bond market players also exceeded 10
percent.
While three of the offices of interest thus show
evidence of significant contributory activity by
interested parties, it is crucial to remember that
contributions in excess of an arbitrary percentage are
not conclusive evidence of undue influence.

Hypothesis

one seeks merely to provide some indication of the
possibility that interested parties perceive
contributions to the campaigns of influential officials
as reasonable behaviour.

1Theriot ran unopposed for reelection, so the analysis
speaks to contributions to his campaign as shorthand for
contributions to candidates for the 83rd State
Representative District seat.
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2.

Hypothesis Two
Another, perhaps more accurate measure of the

likelihood of contributions being made by bond market
players in pursuit of privileged treatment is a
comparison of the distributions of contribution amounts.
The rationale for this comparison is that players, if
seeking to "purchase" business yielding greater than
normal profits, will make correspondingly larger
contributions.

Thus hypothesis two:

H^: The distribution of the size of market player
contributions to officials in a position to exercise
influence is significantly different from that of non
players .
Table 4.4 provides results of an analysis of the
distribution of player contributions in comparison with
that of total contributions.

As noted above, only

contributions of $250 or more were included in this
analysis.

Both Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-

Smirnov statistics are provided.

The Wilcoxon-Mann-

Whitney test measures the central tendency of
distributions, and is arguably slightly more efficient
than the Kolomogorov-Smirnov test for large samples
[Siegel & Castellan, 1988] . The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
is sensitive to any kind of difference in the
distributions from which the samples were drawn.

The
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Table 4.4a
Analysis of Contribution Distributions
Office

Cont Source1

Mean Cont

K-S Z>

2-tail p<=

M-W Z>

2-tail p<=

Tl Sample

BC
UW
Sum
NonPlayer

1395
2105
1708
1412

0.9485
2.2483
1.5

0.3293
0.0001
0.0222

-1.0399
-4.1548
-1.9999

0.2984
0.0001
0.0455

Att General

BC
UW
Sum
NonPlayer

1470
490
1570
1401

0.5121
0.9226
0.6695

0.9557
0.3623
0.7612

-0.3793
-1.3168
-0.532

0.7044
0.1879
0.5947

Governor

BC
UW
Sum
NonPlayer

2070
3021
2558
1609

1.5272
3.0788
2.9014

0.0188
0.0001
0.0001

-2.7706
-5.3715
-5.9325

0.0056
0.0001
0.0001

Lt Governor

BC
UW
Sum
NonPlayer

1042
2750
1286
968

0.5228
0.6535
0.6998

0.9475
0.7866
0.7115

-0.5899
-1.0439
-0.9437

0.5553
0.2965
0.3453

i
.
I
I

1 BC = Bond Counsel
UW = Underwriter
SUM = All Players
NonPlayer = Other Contributors
' Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of distribution
* Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test of equality of distribution
Table cont'd.
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Table 4.4b
Analysis of Contribution Distributions
Office
Sec of State

Cont Source
BC
UW
Sum
NonPlayer

Mean Cont
306
1000
445
1151

K-S Z
1.5052
0.5176
1.1238

2-tail p<=
0.0215
0.9516
0.1599

M-W Z
-2.8344
-0.6839
-2.2364

2-tail p<=
0.0046
0.494
0.0253

Treasurer

BC
UW
Sum
NonPlayer

1136
1589
1438
713

0.4263
2.0025
1.6037

0.9934
0.0007
0.0117

-0.4804
-4.0991
-3.1813

0.6309
0.0001
0.0015

R. Theriot

BC
UW
Sum
NonPlayer

629
417
681
597

0.4035
0.8200
0.6581

0.9968
0.5119
0.7794

-0.5879
-1.1642
-0.7685

0.5566
0.2443
0.4422

S . Nunez

BC
UW
Sum
NonPlayer

756
1169
950
730

1.0842
0.3908
0.9935

0.1904
0.998
0.277

-1.9798
-0.169
-1.3511

0.0477
0.8658
0.1767
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic is influenced by
differences in central tendency, dispersion, and skewness
and may therefore be a more appropriate test for this
purpose.
Results for hypothesis two vary across offices,
although the distribution of contributions by
underwriters differs significantly from that of other
donors over all the offices considered.

Player

contributions to candidates for Governor, Secretary of
State, and Treasurer display evidence of belonging to a
differently distributed population than that of total
contributions.

In the Governor's race both bond counsel

and underwriters appear to contribute more heavily than
one would expect based on overall contributions.

Bond

counsel tended to contribute larger amounts to candidates
for Secretary of State than other contributors, while
underwriters provided larger contributions to candidates
for Treasurer.
Importantly, contributions from players to the other
offices of interest seem in line with those from the
public at large.

This indicates that players do not as a

matter of course contribute larger amounts to all
candidates than other donors, and tends to reinforce the
conclusion that players have more interest in currying
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favour with some officials than with others.

Note

especially that bond counsel

contributions to candidates

for Attorney General are not

demonstrably out of line

with those from other sources.
3.

Hypothesis Three
The municipal bond market literature often suggests

that elected officials can much more easily award
business to their contributors when an issue is placed by
negotiation rather than competitively.

To date, no

irrefutable evidence has been produced demonstrating the
truth of that suggestion.

Hypothesis three attempts to

explore the validity of that

suggestion by testing for a

significant relation between

contributions by players

involved with specific issues and the placement method
used for those issues:
Ha3 Contributions to officials by market players
involved in the issue are significantly related to the
placement method selected.
Table 4.5 presents results of an analysis of
placement method and contributions.

Test statistics

investigate the independence of the distributions of
contributions made by market players dependent upon issue
placement method.

The hypothesis is that players

participating in negotiated issues will contribute larger
amounts than those participating in competitively bid
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Table 4.5
Analysis of Contributions and Placement Method
Comp.
BC1
UW
Sum

Neg.

Mean
Mean
22,248
25, 669
20,468
6, 758
42,716
32, 427

M-W Z1
-4.0052
-8.1134
-5.5171

1-tail p<=
.0000
.0000
.0000

K-S Z1
1.3116
3.8648
3.0014

1-tail p<=
.0320
.0000
.0000

1 BC = Bond Counsel contributions
UW = Underwriter contributions
Sum = All market player contributions
2 Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test of equality of distributions
’ Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of distributions
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issues.

As in the analysis of hypothesis two, both

Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics
are provided.

Contributions by both underwriters and

bond counsel are significantly related to the placement
method selected.

Note that overall market player

contributions are also significantly related to choice of
placement method, despite the opposing direction of the
relationship between contribution size and placement
method between underwriters and bond counsel.
Bond Counsel participating in negotiated bond
issuance contribute more heavily than those involved in
competitively bid issues.

While it seems at first glance

as though bond counsel would have no reason to prefer one
method of placement over the other [regardless of method,
bond counsel are required], they may have less direct
reasons for soliciting negotiated placement business.

As

bond counsel are normally consulted at the inception of a
bond issuance, they may have some influence over the
selection of other players invited to participate in the
transaction.

If that is the case, bond counsel could

extract rents from underwriters in exchange for advancing
the underwriters' case with issuing officials.
As discussed in chapter three, there are wellaccepted reasons for choosing to place an issue by
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negotiation rather than competitive bid.

Therefore, the

rejection of the hypothesis of no relation between
contributions by bond counsel and placement method should
not be seen as conclusive evidence of exercise of undue
influence by elected officials.
Evidence from Table 4.5 indicates that underwriters
participating in competitive issues contribute more.
This result is in direct opposition to our intuition that
campaign contributions by market players are in part fees
expended to purchase non-competitively bid bond issue
business.
As discussed in chapter two, the gap between
negotiated and competitive interest rates has steadily
narrowed over the last few decades.

That is, the benefit

[increased profit] from underwriting negotiated placement
issues as opposed to competitively bid issues has
diminished over time.

Increased attention paid to

negotiated transactions by regulators and the media may
be a factor in this narrowing gap.
Hildreth's [1994] suggestion that campaign
contributions are solicited in exchange for player
inclusion in the pool of approved issuance participants
may provide an explanation for the observed relation
between contribution size and placement method.

His
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theory in part is that contributions are made in exchange
for erection of barriers to entry into the municipal bond
issuance process.

Those barriers to entry may consist of

a list of "approved underwriters and bond counsel"/
requirements as to firm size, experience, geographic
location or innumerable other factors.

If Hildreth's

perceptions are accurate, underwriters may well prefer
competitively bid issues, which are commonly understood
to be much less amenable to influence peddling on the
part of elected officials.

Competitively bid issues thus

are subjected to much less scrutiny than negotiated
issues - the assumption is that market forces will ensure
lowest cost debt placement.
C.

Analyses Using The Regression Model
This project further investigates the relationship

between contributions

and municipal bond business

utilizing regression analyses.

by

The base model is

developed by aggregating variables common to prior
research.

As discussed in chapter two, studies focusing

on municipal debt commonly include the following
variables:
Size

Face amount of the issue

Rating

Bond rating assigned by a ratings agency

MktRate

A measure of municipal market interest rates
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YrstoCall "Lock-in" period of the security
CorNIssue Method used to select underwriter(s)
The most commonly used dependent variable is some
measure of net cost of debt, usually Net Interest Cost.
As explained in chapter two, Net Interest Cost does not
incorporate the time value of money, but is commonly used
in the bond marketplace [NIC is also specified as
required information on the LBC bond issue reporting
form].

In order to facilitate comparison with prior

research this study uses Net Interest Cost as a dependent
variable.
The sample is partitioned into large [over $1
million] and small issues in order to facilitate
comparison with the extant literature, which commonly
uses samples containing only issues of greater than $1
million face value.

As explained in chapter three,

commercial bond information providers routinely collect
data only for issues larger than $1 million, as their
target audience [investors] is primarily concerned with
issues widely available in the market.
Leonard [1996] uses logistic regression analysis to
provide evidence that competitive and negotiated
placement issues should not be pooled into a common
sample for purposes of regression analyses.

Leonard's
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study demonstrates that the influence of explanatory
variables varies across placement method, and thus calls
into question the validity of much prior research.

Note,

however, that much of that literature consists of studies
performed at a time when competitive issues comprised the
vast majority of issues.

Therefore prior research may

have been accurate for the market of the time, while
current research should adapt to the shift in placement
method.
Following Leonard's perception, the portion of the
sample having face amounts greater than $1 million is
further partitioned by placement method.

The small issue

size portion of the sample contains only 7 competitively
placed issues, so is not partitioned.

The assumption is

that issue size is more determinate than placement method
for purposes of this study.
1.

Hypothesis Four
While the regression model used in this study has

been demonstrated to provide explanatory power for bond
issue transactions by prior research, much of that
research took place some time ago.

Hypothesis four seeks

to legitimate the model by using data from current,
Louisiana issues:
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HA4 The independent variables included in the base model
possess significant explanatory power for Net Interest
Cost.
Table 4.6 presents results of the base model
regression analysis.

The model possesses some

explanatory power for issues larger than $1 million
[regardless of placement method], which drives the
model's significance for the sample as a whole.

In the

case of negotiated issues, that significance is centered
in two variables:

face amount of the issue [Facek] and

the market interest rate [BB20Bond].

Competitive issue

NIC is more closely related to the market interest rate
and the "lock-in period" of the investment [YrsToCall].
The model does not provide much explanatory power
for the subsample of issues smaller than $1 million.

As

discussed above, that lack of fit is reasonable given
prior studies' lack of small issue size data.

Of the

model's variables, only the market interest equivalent
[BB20Bond] and "lock in" period [YrstoCall] are
sigificantly related to NIC.

Issuing entity rating

[Rating], issue size [FaceK] and placement method
[CorNIssue] appear to be non-significant contributors to
NIC.

The conclusion is that small issues are constrained

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 4.6
Base Regression Model1 Results (t-values)
Face < $1M
Constant
YrstoCall
FaceK
BB20Bond
Brate
Arate
CorNIssue

Sample Size
Adj. R'
Regression F

3.545247
(2.841)***
-.014813
(-1.808)*
-3.2388E-04
(-1.032)
.375911
(1.753)*
-.128437
(-.450)
-.914219
(-1.230)
.378053
(1.252)
79
.05961
1.82411

Face > $1M
Negotiated
-1.115390
(-.813)
-.007066
(-.556)
1.30442E-05
(2.826)***
1.125523
(4.818)***
.116417
(.466)
-.206842
(-.939)
n/a

Face > $1M
Competitive
.595933
(.810)
-.036782
(-4.175)***
3.16565E-06
(.568)
.919181
(8.269)***
.131479
(.742)
-.326584
(-1.857)*
n/a

Complete
Sample
.693040
(1.285)
-.019730
(-3.632)***
1.12565E-05
(3.348)***
.851314
(9.270)***
.035980
(.307)
-.385344
(-3.306)***
.129855
(1.264)

89
.26927
7.48537

122
.47983
23.32326

290
.33026
24.75179

1 NIC = Size + YrsToCall + Rating + MktRate + CorNIssue
NIC=Net Interest Cost
FaceK=Face amount of the issue/1000
BB20Bond=Bond Buyer 20 Bond Rate for the week of sale
Brate=l if the issue has a rating of Baa or lower
Arate=l if the issue has a rating of Aaa, Aa or A
CorNIssue=l if the issue was placed via competitive bid
123

*
p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01

by factors much different than those influencing larger
issues.
Diagnostics for the model suggest that while not
possessing a high degree of explanatory power, the base
model is relatively robust with respect to common threats
to model adequacy.

Multicollinearity is not a problem,

as the maximum variance inflation factor [VIF] for this
model is 1.64.

Neter et al. [1989] assert that maximum

VIFs in excess of ten indicate multicollinearity
problems, which in turn suggests that multicollinearity
is not an issue for this analysis.

Outlying observations

were identified by inspection of plots and residuals
analysis.

These outliers were evaluated for influence

using DFFITS, DFBETAS, and Cook's Distance calculations.
None of the outliers was determined to be unduly
influential, therefore all of the observations were
incorporated in the analyses [Neter et al., 1989].
2.

Hypotheses Five - Seven
The preceding analyses have demonstrated some

measure of relation between campaign contributions and
bond issue business.

That relation may be seen as

behaviour to be constrained.

As discussed in chapter

one, the approach of the MSRB and various state
regulatory agencies has largely been precisely that.
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Alternatively, one might adopt an accounting perspective
and attempt to develop a cost benefit analysis relating
the benefit of ameliorating that behaviour with the cost
of behaviour modification.
This study seeks to provide some evidence of the
public cost of elected officials trading bond business
for campaign contributions.

The public cost of non-

optimal selection of bond issue participants will [at
least in part] be embedded within Net Interest Cost.
Recall that underwriters profit on a bond issue by
purchasing the issue from the issuer and then reselling
the issue to investors at higher price [that is, higher
effective interest rate].

Therefore the public cost of

non-optimal issuance practices can be measured in part by
the variance in Net Interest Cost attributable to
contributions.
Amounts contributed by the various players in a bond
issue are incorporated into the regression model to test
hypotheses five through seven:
Has
Contributions by bond counsel involved in the
issuance process have significant explanatory power for
Net Interest Cost.
HA6 Contributions by underwriters involved in the
issuance process have significant explanatory power for
Net Interest Cost.
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Ha7 Contributions by all market players involved in the
issuance process have significant explanatory power for
Net Interest Cost.
As shown in Table 4.7, none of the contribution
variables [BCCont, UWCont and SumCont] evidence a
significant association with NIC.

Therefore the analysis

provides no support for hypotheses five, six or seven.
This lack of support should not be construed as evidence
that the behaviour in question does not occur.

As

explained by Hildreth [1994], contributions may be
solicited by officials, and made by bond market players,
as an entry price into a lucrative market [in Hildreth's
terms, pay to play].

If Hildreth's explanation is

accurate, the public cost of this behaviour would only be
determinable by comparison of interest rates in the
municipal bond market with those of alternative
investments not susceptible to third-party moral hazard,
a task beyond the scope of this study.
3.

Hypotheses Eight - Ten
This study also investigates the information

asymmetry of the municipal bond marketplace.

Chapter

three sets forth arguments that the bond market is much
less complete than the equities markets in terms of
information availability.

As explained therein,

governmental financial reporting is troublesome because
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Table 4.7
Extended Model Results1 (t-values)
Face < $1M
Base Model
GO

R>

Brown
BCCont
UWCont
SumCont
AudComp
LADate
Sample Size
A d ] . R*
Regression F

.05961
-.457684
(-2.692)***
-.011744
(-.583)
-7.94084E-05
(-.816)
2.49347E-07
(.013)
-6.2232E-06
(-.258)
-.329138
(-1.397)
.276014
(1.159)

Face > $1M
Negotiated
.26927
-.254027
(-1.248)
-.034825
(-2.693)***
7.42370E-06
(.498)
-7.41031E-06
(-.894)
-3.01699E-06
(-.414)
-.135859
(-.671)
.179120
(.861)

Face > §1M
Competitive
.47983
.111427
(.833)
-.038346
(-2.343)**
5.54763E-07
(.075)
4.02894E-06
(1.084)
2.95349E-06
(.911)
.210046
(.689)
-.205956
(-.807)

Complete
Sample
.33026
-.124195
(-1.352)
-.033302
(-3.960)***
2.09693E-06
(.312)
5.01166E-07
(.149)
1.98705E-06
(.683)
-.135522
(-1.046)
.177875
(1.386)

79
.10482
1.76108

89
.34562
5.22538

122
.50094
12.04154

290
.36182
14.65416
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1 NIC = Base Model + GO + Brown + BCCont + UWCont +SumCont +
AudComp + LADate
GO=l if a general obligation issue
Brown*=Brown's Index score
BCCont=Contributions made by issue's bond counsel
UWCont=Contributions made by issue's underwriters
AudComp^l if issuer is compliant with state reporting statutes
LADate=l if last issuer audit within 12 months of sale date
*
p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01
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of a lack of easily quantifiable measures of goal
achievement.

That is, the goal of government is not to

produce maximal profits in the form of cash but rather to
produce maximal return on investment in terms of services
provided to some constituency.

This lack of "bottom

line" focus has often been offered as an explanation [ego
te absolvo?] for the common perception of government
financial reports as arcane or labrynthine.
Brown [1993] provides a scoring system whereby
information commonly available from the general purpose
financial reports [GPFS] of a governmental entity can be
summarized and compared with similar scores for other
entities with similar characteristics [most commonly
population].

Brown's contention is that this index may

thus be used as a proxy for some of the information
contained within financial reports.

Strongly influencing

Brown's argument is the notion that most investors,
indeed the majority of governmental officials, are unable
or unwilling to parse GPFS's for relevant information.
Thus Brown's Index provides useable information not
otherwise available to the majority of investors:
information concerning the entity's financial position
and ability to repay debt.

Hypothesis eight investigates

the relation between that information and NIC:
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HA8 Brown's Index of financial well-being has
significant explanatory power for NIC.
Table 4.7 demonstrates that Brown's Index [Brown] is
significantly related to NIC for issues larger than $1
million.

Small issues, as noted above, exist in a

necessarily smaller market, and it seems reasonable to
suppose that players in that smaller, and less complete,
market are possessed of information about the issuing
entity and its debt-repayment ability outside the bounds
of publicly available financial reports.
A measure of the public availability of entity
financial information is compliance with state reporting
requirements.

Louisiana statutes require audited

financial reports biannually for all governmental
entities.

Noncompliance with statutes, as indicated in

chapter three, does not entail onerous penalties, making
it possible for entities to neglect financial reporting
without dire consequences.
Information about the financial status of debtors is
routinely shown to be a factor in credit and investment
decisions.

Availability of that information for

governmental entities is not, however, assured as it is
for non-governmental entities issuing securities
publicly.

Hypothesis nine speaks to financial
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information availability in a minimal sense by using
state reporting requirement compliance:
Ha9
Issuing entity compliance with state financial
reporting requirements [AudComp] has significant
explanatory power for NIC.
There are 82 entities not in compliance with state
reporting requirements at the time their bond issue was
presented to the LBC for approval.

Of these entities, 39

were issuing debt with face value less than $1 million.
70 placed issues by negotiation, while 12 used the
competitive bid process.

Compliance with reporting

requirements is not significantly related to NIC for any
of the sample subsets, or for the sample as a whole.
Given the above-mentioned truism that information as
to the financial status of debtors is relevant to
investment and credit decisions, it is surprising that no
relation is found between public availability of audited
financial data and NIC.

The reason may lie in the

incompleteness of the bond market and the competitive
advantage of market players.

It is doubtful that

underwriters would agree to purchase issues without
information as to the entity's ability to retire the
issue, but entirely possible that parties to the
transaction [bond counsel, underwriters, private
placement purchasers] acquire that information through

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

131

nonpublic channels, and in fact demand that information
prior to participation.

The incomplete nature of the

bond market may function to limit the necessity of
disseminating that information more completely.
Another tenet of market theory holds that financial
information possesses value in relation to its
timeliness.

That is, financial information is more

valuable when more recent.

Investors should therefore

demand [again, by way of interest cost] continuing
financial reporting.

Given that it is not uncommon for

an issue approved by the LBC to be brought to market one
or two years later, it seems likely that market players
and investors would prefer more current information than
that available at time of LBC approval.
The value of timely information, as indicated by an
audited financial report dated within twelve months of
the issue's date of sale, is explored by hypothesis ten:
Ha10 Timeliness of financial data [LADate] has
significant explanatory power for NIC.
As for compliance with state reporting requirements,
there is no significant relation demonstrated between
timeliness of financial reports and NIC.
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D.

Extension of Regression Analyses
Leonard [1996] provides evidence that past attempts

to determine factors of Net Interest Cost for bond issues
may have been flawed.

Leonard's contention is that

competitively bid issues are not identical to negotiated
issues in terms of influencing factors.

Equally, bond

issues with dedicated repayment streams [Revenue bonds]
are argued to differ from issues sold without the backing
of specific repayment sources.

As mentioned in chapter

one, the majority of bonds issued in recent years have
been revenue bonds.

As with the competitive versus

negotiated split, this shift in bond characteristics may
indicate a fundamental change in the underlying
characteristics of the bond marketplace.
In order to examine the significance of repayment
options on the NIC models developed in this study, the
portion of the sample with face value of $ 1 million or
more was partitioned by repayment schema.

Tables 4.8 and

4.9 present results of redoing the regression analyses
discussed above with the modified sample partitions.
The base model [Table 4.8] results clearly
demonstrate that GO bond interest costs are much more
closely approximated than those of Revenue issues.
Significant variables in the analysis of GO issues
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Table 4.8
Bond Type Base Regression Model1 Results (t-values)

Constant
YrstoCall
FaceK
BB20Bond
Brate
Arate
CorNIssue

Sample Size
Adj. R'
Regression F

Face < SIM

Face > $1M
Revenue

Face > SIM
G O

Complete
Sample

3.545247
(2.841)***
-.014813
(-1.808)*
-3.2388E-04
(-1.032)
.375911
(1.753)*
- 128437
(-.450)
-.914219
(-1.230)
.378053
(1.252)

.113113
(.105)
-.015061 (1.303)
1.06752E-05
(2.408)**
.937116
(5.164)***
.497278
(2.013)**
-.2443440
(-1.114)
-.155353
(-.820)

-.154359
(-.296)
-.038522
(-5.698)***
4.54980E-06
(.627)
.982754
(11.419)***
.-.065721
(-.537)
-.221129
(-1.656)
.426598
(3.611)***

.693040
(1.285)
-.019730
(-3.632)***
1.12565E-05
(3.348)***
.851314
(9.270)***
.035980
(.307)
-.385344
(-3.306)***
.129855
(1.264)

79
.05961
1.82411

114
..26913
7.93507

97
.74427
47.56622

290
.33026
24.75179

1 NIC = Size + YrsToCall + Rating + MktRate + CocNIssue
NIC=Net Interest C>, i
FaceK=Face amount of the j .isue/1000
BB20Bond=Bond Buyer 20 Bond Rate for the week of sale
Brate=l if the issue has a rating of Baa or lower
Arate=l if the issue has a rating of Aaa, Aa or A
CorNIssue=l if the issue was placed via competitive bid
*
P < .10
**
P < .05
* ★ * P < .01
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include market interest rate [BB20Bond], investment
period [YRsToCall] and placement method [CorNIssue]. As
would seem reasonable, market interest rate is directly
related to NIC and inversely related to the length of the
investment period.
Higher NIC are associated with competitive
placement.

This relation is contrary to our expectations

that competitive placement, by virtue of its public bid
process, will produce lower NIC than a privately
negotiated, non-market transaction.

Note, however, that

placmemnt method is not a significant variable with
respect to the Revenue bond portion of the sample.
Table 4.9 presents data from the extended model. As
in the prior analysis, underwriter contributions
[UWCont]and total player contributions [SumCont] are not
significant contributors to the model.

Bond counsel

contributions are significant for the sample composed of
large general obligation [G 0] bonds.

This significance

must be interpreted cautiously because of the previously
mentioned near-monopoly on bond counsel business by a
single firm.
Variables representing timely availability of
financial information also demonstrate no significant
explanatory power for NIC.

For Revenue bonds, Brown's

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 4.9
Bond Type Extended Model Results1 (t-values)
Face < $1M
Base Model

R'

Comp
Brown
BCCont
UWCont
SumCont
AudComp
LADate
Sample Size
Adj. R2
Reqression F

.05961

Face > $1M
Revenue
.26918

Face > SIM
G O
.74427

Complete
Sample
.33026

.433513
(1.332)
-.014854
(-.706)
-6.50014E-05
(-.640)
-3.91658E-06
(-.159)
-6.2232E-06
(-.258)
-.235429
(-.966)
.262559
(1.055)

-.007801
(-.039)
-.044949
(-3.411)***
2.17941E-05
(1.658)
2.30374E-06
(.412)
5.72204E-06
(1.15)
-.116894
(-.522)
..096466
(.426)

.304940
(2.197)**
-.005809
(-.456)
-1.37299E-05
(-2.597)**
9.97911E-07
(.296)
-3.02191E-06
(-.999)
.098015
(.488)
.046125
(.268)

-.124195
(-1.352)
-.033302
(-3.960)***
2.09693E-06
(.312)
5.01166E-07
(.149)
1.98705E-06
(.683)
-.135522
(-1.046)
.177875
(1.386)

79
.02135
1.15471

114
.33541
6.18457

97
.75326
27.64262

290
.36182
14.65416
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1 NIC = Base Model + GO + Brown + BCCont + UWCont +SumCont +
AudComp + LADate
GO=l if a general obligation issue
Brown=Brown's Index score
BCCont=Contributions made by issue's bond counsel
UWCont=Contributions made by issue's underwriters
AudComp=l if issuer is compliant with state reporting statutes
LADate=l if last issuer audit within 12 months of sale date
*
p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01
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Index is inversely related to NIC, in line with our
expectations that increasing financial health enables
entities to borrow at lower rates.

Note, however, that

Brown's Index displays no explanatory power over NIC for
the general obligation bond sample.

This result is

counterintuitive, as we would expect information
concerning financial health of the issuing entity to be
more important to prospective purchasers of debt not
incorporating specific revenue streams for payback.
E.

Summary
This chapter details data collection methods and

presents descriptive information about the disparate
datasets used in the analysis.

Results of the

nonparametric analyses of campaign financing are
presented and interpreted in terms of the theoretic
approach detailed in chapter one.

Results of a

regression analysis with the sample data partitioned by
size and placement method are discussed, as are results
of a further analysis of the sample partitioned by
repayment characteristics.
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Chapter Five

Summary and Conclusions
This chapter summarizes the study and provides an
interpretation of results aimed at both aligning the
study with other research in the field and discussing the
implications of the study for public policy.

The first

section presents a brief overview of the study's intent
and methodology.

Results of the research and

implications for policymakers are discussed in the second
section.

Section three focuses on limitations of the

study and the chapter concludes with suggestions for
further research.
A.

Overview of the Study
Past research investigating the municipal bond

marketplace has focused on determining factors that
influence cost of debt.

While there has been significant

agreement between the various studies as to influential
factors, it is important to note that the municipal debt
marketplace has changed significantly since the majority
of that research was performed.

For example, the portion

of issues sold via the competitive bid process has gone
from 80 percent of all issues to less than 20 percent.
Similarly, the percentage of general obligation debt has
137
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decreased while that of revenue bonds has increased.
Therefore a reassessment of factors influencing cost of
debt is warranted.
Interest has also increased in the mechanisms of
municipal debt issuance, driven in part by the tremendous
increase in municipal debt issuance and the general
tightening of municipal finances caused by exogenous
economic factors.

Municipal debt has become a much more

widely held investment vehicle as well.

The increase in

appeal of municipal debt has emphasized the lack of
information available to potential investors, and
revitalized research investigating the municipal debt
market.
Additionally, perceptions of the market as biased
and amenable to privileged trading have focused regulator
interest.

Federal and state regulators have evinced an

abiding interest in the municipal debt marketplace.

A

significant portion of that interest revolves around the
ability of elected officials to extract campaign
contributions as a quid pro quo for bond business.
This study attempts to investigate the relationship
between political contributions and municipal bond
transactions in Louisiana.

Data was collected from

several state agencies - the Legislative Auditor's Office
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[entity financial statements], the Louisiana Bond
Commission [information about bond issues], and the State
Board of Ethics [capaign finance filings].

Nonparametric

tests were used to investigate the relationship between
bond market player contributions and bond transactions.
Regression analysis was used as a means to examine the
relationships

between several proxies for financial

information availability and as a tool to explore the
public cost of influence peddling.
B.

Results and Implications
The first section of the study sought to establish

evidence that players in the municipal bond market behave
differently than the rest of the public with respect to
campaign contributions to candidates for influential
office.

Influential offices were defined as those

elected members of the state government in a postion to
affect municipal bond issuance transactions by either the
state or one of its political subdivisions [Governor, Lt.
Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, State
Treasurer, and those members of the legislature sitting
on the Louisiana Bond Commission].
Contributions by bond market players accounted for
more than ten percent of total contributions to
candidates for the office of State Treasurer, and for two
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of the legislators sitting on the LBC.

One of the

legislators was President of the Senate at the time, and
the other subsequently ran successfully for the office of
State Treasurer.

Thus expectations that bond market

players are sources of significant levels of
contributions to candidates for influential office were
only partially met.

Explanations for this may rest in

the relative size of total campaign contributions to the
various offices, and in the fact that several of the
candidates were running unopposed.
A second measure of influence via contributions to
campaigns is a comparison of the distribution of
contributions from market players with that of non-market
players.

Nonparametric tests of equality of distribution

were used to investigate the significance of differences
between distribution of contribution amounts.

These

tests were itemized by office, as the initial analyses
indicated differences in contributory behaviour across
the offices of interest.

The tests were also partitioned

by player type [bond counsel or underwriter], as staff at
both the LBC and the Legislative Auditor's Office
suggested that benefits [and hence motivations] were
likely to differ between the two.
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For the offices of interest as a group, the
distribution of contributions by underwriters is
significantly different from that of non-market players:
contributions by underwriters tend to be larger than
those made by the balance of the population.

This

difference is large enough that the distribution of all
player contributions is also significantly higher than
that of non-market players.

Likewise, the distributions

of contributions to the Governor's and State Treasurer's
candidates were significantly higher than those of nonmarket players, again driven by underwriter
contributions.
A final measure of the relationship between
contributions by market players and bond business is less
direct.

As discussed in chapter two, a common assumption

made by observers of the public finance markets is that
influence peddling is much easier [and more profitable]
when municipal bond issues are placed via negotiation
rather than the competitive bidding process.

If that

assumption is true, we should see a direct relation
between contribution levels and selection of placement
method.

Our expectations are that higher contributions
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will be an indication that placements are more likely to
be negotiated than competitively bid.
Tests of the association between contribution levels
and placement method do not produce results in line with
expectations.

Contrary to expectations, the relationship

between underwriter contributions and negotiated
placements is negative - that is, higher contributions
are associated with competitive placements.

The

association between bond counsel contributions and
negotiated placement is positive.

As discussed in

chapter four, bond counsel may prefer negotiated
placement because, as originary members of the project
staff, they are able to influence underwriter choice.

If

counsel can indeed influence underwriter choice they are
therefore able to extract rents of some sort from
underwriters.

In this situation influence peddling, if

extant, is an indirect relation between underwriters,
bond counsel, and elected officials.
Explanations for the unexpected negative
relationship between underwriter contributions and
placement method may be a function of the narrowing of
the spread between negotiated and competitively placed
issues, which functions to minimize the benefits of
negotiated placement [that is, underwriters seem no
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longer able to extract excess rents via negotiated
transactions]. Note also that as regulators and other
interested parties focus more attention on negotiated
issues they tend to concurrently assume that
competitively bid issues are less in need of review.
Underwriters seeking to benefit from influence peddling
may therefore prefer competitively bid isses.

This

explanation is supported by Hildreth's [1994] suggestion
that "pay-to-play" has supplanted more direct forms of
influence peddling.

Again, Hildreth's proposition is

that bond market players, rather than buying business in
discrete quanta, buy into the pool of qualified bond
issue participants.
Thus the first section of the study produces results
only partially in accord with expectations.

While

contributions from players in the bond market are
demonstrably larger than those from other members of the
public, it is far from clear that there is any direct
influence being sold.
The second section of the study utilizes linear
regression techniques in an attempt to discern the public
cost of the theorized peddling of influence.

As a

baseline for the analysis, a regression model was created
by aggregating variables common to prior research.

The

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

144
baseline model, in line with prior research, uses Net
Interest Cost as a dependent variable, and the face
amount of the issue, rating assigned by external agency
[if any], a measure of market interest rates for the week
of issue sale [the Bond Buyer 20 Bond Index], and years
to first call [a measure of the "lock-in period" of the
investment] as independent variables.

This baseline

should enable ready assimilation of the study into the
extant literature.

A further advantage of the baseline

approach is a more effective isolation of the effects [if
any] of contributory behaviour on Net Interest Cost
[NIC].
The sample of bond issues is partitioned into large
[face value greater than $1 million] and small issues.
The large group is then partioned by placement method
[competitive or negotiated]. As explained in chapter
four, Leonard [1996] provides compelling evidence that
negotiated and competitively bid issues are influenced
differently, and the partitioning of sample data
acknowledges the strength of Leonard's arguments.
As the baseline model is an aggregation of variables
found significant in past research, we expect the model
to possess considerable explanatory power over NIC.
Congruent with the discussion in chapter four, the model
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does not fit the small issue subsample particularly well.
That lack of fit is reasonable given the lack of small
face value issues in prior research samples.

Prior

research, often limited by availability of data, focused
almost exclusively on larger issues, thus producing
models composed of items pertinent to investors weighing
alternatives in the larger capital markets.

Smaller

issues, on the other hand, are sold in a much less
complete market, and are sold to investors with different
concerns.
The baseline model also possesses limited
explanatory power over larger issues placed by
negotiation.

One rationale for this lack of fit is the

ability of negotiated issue participants to acquire
information outside normal channels of distribution.
Size of the issue and prevailing market interest rate are
the only significant variables in the model for
negotiated issues, which adds credence to the theory that
participants have non-public channels for information
[that is, they do not rely on agency ratings].
Large competitive issues are most closely modeled by
the baseline equation.

This is congruent with the

perceived characteristics of the bond market during the
majority of prior research.

The baseline model thus

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

146
provides a link to prior research and an indication of
how the municipal bond market has changed structurally
over the intervening period.
Arguments concerning regulation of political
contributions by bond market players tend to focus on the
public cost of such activities,

The perception is that

market players recoup the cost of contributions by
lowering the price at which they are willing to purchase
debt issued by the entities of officials contributed to.
If contributions to officials of debt-issuing entities
can be properly characterized as purchases of influence
for which below market prices of municipal debt will be
the quid pro quo, it also is reasonable to assume that
larger contributions will elicit [command] larger
variances from market interest rates.

That is,

contributions by successful players should be significant
additions to the baseline model.
Contrary to expectations, contributions by market
players evidence no explanatory power over NIC.

This

suggests that the common perception of the municipal debt
marketplace as rife with corruption is either wrong or
misspecifies the problem.

Note that the lack of

significance holds for player contributions considered as
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a whole as well as individually [bond counsel or
underwriter].
Implications for policymakers are contrary to the
opinions expressed by regulators.

Given the study's

failure to find a relationship between market player
contributions and NIC it does not appear that influence
peddling behaviour, if it exists, significantly affects
the public cost of entity debt issuance.

If influence

peddling was a factor in the observed elections, it was
not widely evident from an analysis of reported campaign
contributions.

Regulation can, of course, only be

enforced over the universe of reported events.
Therefore, regulation of market player contributions may
be beneficial from a perspective of image management, but
it does not seem likely to pass the sort of cost benefit
analysis accountants routinely impose on decision
alternatives.
This study also investigates the information
asymmetry of the municipal debt marketplace.

If

generally accepted accounting theory is given credence,
information embedded in publicly available financial
statments will have a demonstrable relationship to NIC.
That is, investors will use said information to determine
the risk/return on investment tradeoff of that particular
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investment.

If such is the case, we should see a

significant and negative relationship between increasing
measures of financial health and NIC.
Information from bond-issuing entities' General
Purpose Financial Statements is used to create Brown's
Index of Financial Health.

As discussed in chapter four,

Brown's Index is calculated by preparation of ten
measures of financial health.

Those ratios are then

scored by comparison with the ratios of comparably sized
entities participating in the Government Finance Officers
Association's Certification for Excellence in Financial
Reporting program and the scores summed to provide the
index.
Obviously not all entities choose to participate in
the GFOA's program: equally obviously participants do not
represent a random sample of entities.

However,

participants in the program are arguably among the
healthiest of entities, and thus the possibility of
overstatement of financial health is minimal.

Given that

investors are motivated to seek out the healthiest
entities to invest in, this index seems a reasonable
choice for investigating the relationship between
financial information and investor assessment of risk
[aka NIC].
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Results of the regression analyses indicate that the
hypothesized negative relation between Brown's Index and
NIC does exist for issues with face amounts larger than
$1 million.

NIC of issues smaller than $1 million is not

significantly influenced by Brown's Index, a result which
is in accordance with our intuition that smaller issue
investors have different concerns than large issue
investors.

Smaller issue investors also tend to be

institutions within the region, which may indicate that
these investors are provided with information exogenous
to and perhaps contradictory to that found in financial
reports.

Another interpretation is that financial report

based measures of financial health are not as precise for
smaller entities.

In other words, the smaller

transaction amounts endemic to smaller entities, and the
correspondingly larger percentage variances, may make the
use of standardized ratios problematic.
The study also investigates the effect of
information timeliness on NIC.

Financial information is

often likened to newspaper stories and portrayed as
information with value that decreases markedly over time.
The rationale for that portrayal is simply that investors
will act immediately on information they receive.

The

ability to profitably use information is thus tightly
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constrained by its age.

Investors should therefore be

willing to pay a premium for more recent information.
Two measurements of timeliness are incorporated in
this study.

First, a dichotomous variable signifying

compliance with Louisiana statutes governing entity
financial disclosure [AudComp] is incorporated into the
regression model.

As discussed in chapter three,

Louisiana statutes require at a minimum biannual audited
financial reports.

Compliance with these statutes is

measured as of the date the entity's bond issue was
presented to the LBC for approval.

This measure of

timely disclosure exhibits no significant relation with
NIC.
Second, a more restrictive measure of information
timeliness is created by determining whether the debt
issuing entity had released audited financial reports
dated within twelve months of the sale date of the bond
issue [LastAud].

Investors, if making investment

decisions, should be interested in information current at
the time of their decision.

That is, at the moment when

the bond issue becomes an investment alternative rather
than when the entity solicits state approval for the
issue.

The second measure of timeliness of information
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disclosure should therefore be more closely related to
effects on NIC.
Neither of the two measures of information
timeliness demonstrate significant explanatory power over
NIC.

This result is in line with accounting research

studies looking at corporate information disclosure,
which suggest that the influence of publicly reported
financial information on stock prices [cost of funds] is
largely embedded within stock prices prior to the
official release date of the information.

While bond

issues are peripatetic events rather than a continuous
market, a similar phenomena seems reasonable given that
the equity and debt markets are, at least to some degree,
substitutes for one another.
Implications of this analysis for legislators and
regulators are clear - statutory requirement of public
entity financial reporting does not appear to benefit
investors in municipal debt by providing decision-useful
information.

Importantly, this analysis does not address

other audiences for municipal financial reporting.
Concerned citizens, special interest groups, and
government oversight committees may well benefit from
mandated reporting.

The only point this analysis makes

is that the timeliness of financial reporting by debt
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issuing entities does not appear to influence the cost of
that debt.
C.

Limitations
In an effort to standardize regulatory constraints

on contributory behaviour and limit variations in
exogenous economic factors sample data was collected from
entities within a single state.

While that strategy

reduces the risk of mistaking economic or cultural
variance for influence of the factors studied, it
perforce limits generalizability of the study to other
political subdivisions of the country.

The majority of

players in the bond market in Louisiana reside within the
borders of the state, and primarily do business in
Louisiana.
Regulation governing the behaviour of those players
and the entities they do business with is also unique to
Louisiana.

There may be considerable similarities

between statutes concerning political contributions,
financial disclosure and municipal debt issuance in
Louisiana and those of other states, but the degree of
that similarity should be determined before extrapolation
of this research to other states.
Another limitation of the study is the necessary
reliance upon self-reported data from self-interested
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parties.

While campaign finance reports have been

required for some time and thus candidates have had time
to learn the requirements of those reports/ there is
little assurance that the reports as mandated and filed
contain an information set completely specifying all
contributions and their sources.

Staff at the SBE audit

a sample of the filings, and the reports are available
for public perusal and questioning, however the volume of
reports filed [over six thousand per election year]
limits the probability of a report being audited and that
limitation may influence the preparation of the report.
Similarly, bond issue data was gathered from a time
span in which information disclosure was largely
voluntary.

The Louisiana state government has

implemented regulations requiring completed issue
worksheet filings, but implementation of that regulation
is constrained by the limited number of staff available
to oversee compliance and by an unwillingness on the part
of market players to comply with the regulations.
Therefore the sample of bond issues included in this
sample is not random, although it is composed of every
issue for which the requisite information was accessible.
The composition of the pool of market players in
Louisiana may well be unique also.

A single law firm
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handles approximately 90 percent of the bond counsel work
in the state.

The bond counsel market, therefore, can

hardly be described as open or complete.

This lack of

completeness in the market, coupled with a tendency for
bond counsel to charge whatever the State Legal
Commission sets as a maximum fee for bond counsel work,
perhaps limits the application of this research to other,
more complete, markets.

Note, however, that the single

law firm handling the majority of bond counsel business
maintains that majority in part by merging with or
purchasing firms which demonstrate an ability to get and
keep bond counsel business.
This study looks at the campaign contributions of
bond market players to statewide officials in a position
to influence bond issue transactions.

Arguably,

influence peddling also goes on at the local level.

For

Louisiana, that local level is difficult to isolate.
Louisiana municipalities tend be governed by elected
councils, who often select mayors and city treasurers
from their own ranks.

Determining ex ante which

officials might be selected would require a degree of
knowledge not easily available and which would require a
strong focus on each entity of interest.

As our

perception of bond market players is one of individuals
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interested in doing business with as many entities as
possible, it is likely that market players are not
willing to devote the time and energy necessary to keep
up with the local political situation of multiple,
relatively small entities that do not issue debt often.
D.

Suggestions for Future Research
The results of this research are based solely on

data relating to transactions taking place in Louisiana.
As mentioned earlier, the single state focus of the study
may limit generalizability of results to other locations.
An important extension of this study would thus be
research using data from other states.
While political and regulatory environments probably
mandate individual state by state analyses, multiple
studies of states could be combined using meta-analytic
techniques.

Such a meta-analysis would provide valuable

information concerning commonalities across political and
cultural borders.

Illuminating the commonalities would

allow better-informed conclusions to be drawn concerning
the underlying structure of the municipal bond market,
and provide input to the regulatory process currently
underway at the national level.
The discussion of results above mentions that bond
issue data was provided to the LBC on a voluntary basis
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prior to 1993.

The voluntary nature of that disclosure

[of transaction details] can be interpreted as suggesting
that the bond issues included in this study do not
represent a random sample of Louisiana issues.

Similar

research focusing on a period after disclosure became
mandatory would not be subject to that interpretation,
and could therefore provide additional evidence of the
significance of issuing entity financial disclosure
variables.
The literature would also benefit from more
ethnographic approaches to the problem of influence
peddling by elected officials.

The necessarily sub rosa

nature of that influence peddling suggests that
statistical analyses, focusing on large quantities of
publicly available data rather than the stories told by
individuals involved in specific situations, may not be
the most effective method of studying the issues at hand.
In-depth studies of the individuals involved on a case by
case basis might provide a more accurate picture of the
problem, and would enable researchers to address common
perceptions of political behaviour and the bond market
more readily.
Another important extension of the study would be a
replication performed with data from the period
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immediately subsequent to the effective date of MSRB Rule
G-37.

That replication would allow at least limited

conclusions to be drawn concerning the efficacy of
regulatory activity. Comparison of data between the two
studies might also provide indirect evidence of influence
peddling by highlighting changes in relative market
position of players as contributory activity was
constrained.
This research project is currently being expanded by
investigations of data from other states.

One of the

enabling factors in expanding the study is the trend
toward making campaign finance data available
electronically.

The Federal Election Commission and

several of the relevant state agencies are currently
allowing access to filings via electronic means, which
greatly reduces the time and financial investment
necessary to conduct similar studies.

Similarly, the

MSRB and the various states are in the process of
instituting financial disclosure repositories where
entities can place their financial reports for improved
public access.
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